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Security audit

agentbook

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for Agentbook messaging, but it combines wallet and credential capabilities with mutable install/update paths and broad agent installation guidance that need review before use.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Prefer pinned, checksummed release artifacts over curl-to-bash, avoid update --yes, install only into the agent you actually use, and do not enable yolo wallet or background credential services unless you understand the wallet spending and credential exposure model.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:33
Finding

Mutable Remote Installation Script Is Executed Directly by Bash

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

Executable Archives Are Downloaded Through Mutable Latest-Release URLs Without Integrity Metadata

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:332
Finding

Skill Installation Executes Unpinned Package Tooling and References Mutable Upstream Content

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (12)

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The | bash construct chains network retrieval directly into command execution, eliminating the opportunity to inspect the payload before it runs. This is dangerous because any malicious or altered response becomes instant shell code with the user's privileges.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Install pre-built binaries (recommended)
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ardabotai/agentbook/main/install.sh | bash

# Or self-update if already installed
agentbook update

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a self-update path for the installed tool, meaning future code can change outside the reviewed skill contents. In combination with wallet, messaging, and smart-contract functionality, self-modifying tooling substantially increases the blast radius of an upstream compromise or malicious release.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

Install pre-built binaries (recommended)

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ardabotai/agentbook/main/install.sh | bash

Or self-update if already installed

agentbook update

text

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The dedicated self-update section normalizes fetching and installing the latest release from GitHub without pinning or artifact verification. That creates a strong supply-chain risk because the executable may materially change after review while retaining the same privileged role in agent workflows.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

Requires 1Password CLI for non-interactive authentication. Without it, use agentbook up for interactive startup.

Self-update

bash
agentbook update         # Check for and install latest release from GitHub

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The description says to use the skill whenever 'interacting with agentbook,' which is broad and lacks explicit limits around high-risk actions like sending messages, managing wallets, or calling smart contracts. Overbroad activation increases the chance an agent invokes the skill in contexts the user did not intend, especially where funds or sensitive communications are involved.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The installation section recommends curl ... | bash, which executes remote script contents immediately without review, checksum verification, or version pinning. This is a classic high-risk supply-chain pattern because any compromise of the source, network path, or referenced script can lead to arbitrary code execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

bash
agentbook update         # Check for and install latest release from GitHub
agentbook update --yes   # Skip confirmation prompt

Identity

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to run npx skills without pinning an exact package version, so the executed code may change over time or be replaced by a compromised upstream release. In a security-sensitive skill that also manages messaging, wallets, and contract interactions, this weakens supply-chain integrity and reproducibility.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

This invocation again relies on npx skills without an explicit version, which causes live code retrieval at execution time from the npm ecosystem. If the package is updated maliciously or the publisher account is compromised, users may execute unintended code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Unpinned npx skills introduces a supply-chain risk because the package contents are not fixed and may differ between executions. Since this skill is meant for broad installation into agent environments, a compromised dependency could gain significant execution privileges.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The command fetches and executes the latest package version implicitly, which is unsafe for a skill distributed to automation-capable agents. The context makes this more dangerous because the installed skill can influence agent behavior around messaging and wallet operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Using npx skills without version pinning leaves users exposed to upstream package drift or compromise. In an agent-skill ecosystem, that risk extends beyond a one-time install because the resulting skill may shape future privileged actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This line fetches a script from a remote URL and pipes it directly into a shell, enabling immediate arbitrary code execution from external content. The risk is amplified here because the installed software can later handle credentials, network messaging, and blockchain transactions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Install pre-built binaries (recommended)
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ardabotai/agentbook/main/install.sh | bash

# Or self-update if already installed
agentbook update

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.