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Security audit

Hail Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a clearly disclosed Hail integration for sending email, SMS, and voice calls, with expected third-party data transmission and no hidden local execution.

Install only if you want your agent to use Hail as an external communications provider. Treat emails, phone numbers, message bodies, call prompts, owner email, claim URLs, and the HAIL_API_KEY as sensitive. Require clear user approval and recipient consent before signup or any outbound email, SMS, or voice call, and avoid bulk or sensitive communications unless your legal/compliance basis is settled.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly enables sending email, SMS, and voice calls through a third-party service, but the description does not clearly warn users that recipient contact details, message content, and owner email will be transmitted to an external provider. This omission can lead to uninformed handling of sensitive personal data and unexpected privacy/compliance exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The signup flow transmits the human owner's email address to an external service and instructs the agent to accept terms on the owner's behalf. Even though the text advises confirming approval first, this creates privacy and authorization risk because an agent could disclose personal data or bind a user to third-party terms without robust consent handling.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

only set tou_accepted after confirming your owner is okay with that.

bash
curl -s -X POST https://hail.so/api/agent/signup \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"owner_email":"YOUR_OWNER@example.com","agent_name":"YOUR_NAME","tou_accepted":true,"ref":"clawhub"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This endpoint sends recipient email addresses and message content to an external communications provider. In context, that is the intended function of the skill, but it is still security-relevant because it can expose personal or sensitive content to a third party and can be abused for unauthorized outbound messaging if user consent and recipient validation are weak.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Email
curl -s -X POST https://api.hail.so/emails \
  -H "authorization: Bearer $HAIL_API_KEY" -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"to":["someone@example.com"],"subject":"Hello from my agent","body_text":"Sent via Hail.","recipient_consent":true}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This endpoint transmits phone numbers and SMS content to an external provider, which materially increases privacy and regulatory risk because SMS often involves personal contact data and consent requirements. In the hands of an autonomous agent, this can enable spam, harassment, or accidental disclosure if sends are not tightly governed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

md
-d '{"to":["someone@example.com"],"subject":"Hello from my agent","body_text":"Sent via Hail.","recipient_consent":true}'

# SMS
curl -s -X POST https://api.hail.so/sms \
  -H "authorization: Bearer $HAIL_API_KEY" -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"to":"+15551234567","body":"Hello from my agent via Hail.","recipient_consent":true}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The voice-call API sends phone numbers and a system prompt to an external service that will generate or deliver a call on the agent's behalf. This is more dangerous in context because autonomous calling can facilitate harassment, impersonation, social engineering, or disclosure of sensitive content to unintended recipients.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

-d '{"to":"+15551234567","body":"Hello from my agent via Hail.","recipient_consent":true}'

Voice call

curl -s -X POST https://api.hail.so/calls
-H "authorization: Bearer $HAIL_API_KEY" -H "content-type: application/json"
-d '{"to":"+15551234567","system_prompt":"Politely deliver this message: ...","recipient_consent":true}'

text