T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:3- Finding
Mandatory Skill Workflow Hijacks Unrelated Agent Tasks
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a disclosed project-memory tool, but it tells agents to run external LLM-backed commands before broadly any work and to persist new memory after implementation without a clear user consent boundary.
Review this before installing in sensitive repositories. Use it only when you intentionally want project memory queried or updated, avoid sending secrets or regulated data to LLM providers, inspect proposed `.brv/context-tree/` entries before relying on them, and prefer a pinned or otherwise verified CLI installation over the documented global latest install.
SKILL.md:3Mandatory Skill Workflow Hijacks Unrelated Agent Tasks
SKILL.md:8Mandatory Curation Can Poison Persistent Agent Memory
SKILL.md:143Project Context and File Contents May Be Disclosed to an External LLM Provider
SKILL.md:9Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package
The skill explicitly guides users to connect third-party model providers, including supplying API keys on the command line. This creates security risk because it normalizes secret handling in shell history/process arguments and enables project context handled by brv to be routed to external providers with different data retention and governance properties.
brv providers list
brv providers connect openai --api-key sk-xxx --model gpt-4.1
The skill states that brv query and brv curate send user-supplied text and included file contents to a configured LLM provider, and that cloud sync commands send knowledge to ByteRover's cloud service. In a knowledge-management skill that encourages frequent use, these are direct exfiltration pathways for local project data, making the context materially more dangerous than a purely local tool.
**File access**: The `-f` flag on `brv curate` reads files from the current project directory only. Paths outside the project root are rejected. Maximum 5 files per command, text and document formats only.
**LLM usage**: `brv query` and `brv curate` send context to a configured LLM provider for processing. The LLM sees the query or curate text and any included file contents. No data is sent to ByteRover servers unless you explicitly run `brv push`.
**Cloud sync**: `brv push` and `brv pull` require authentication (`brv login`) and send knowledge to ByteRover's cloud service. All other commands operate without ByteRover authentication.
The skill instructs agents to use ByteRover "before any work," creating an unconditional pre-action dependency that can cause unnecessary disclosure of project context to an external LLM provider. Because brv query may transmit queries and local knowledge to a configured provider, this broad trigger expands exposure well beyond user-authorized or task-necessary use.
The trigger conditions are overly broad, including ordinary situations like recalling something or checking for rules "before performing any action." In this skill's context, that broadness is dangerous because it encourages routine transmission of prompts and stored context to an external model provider, potentially leaking internal policies, source details, or sensitive operational context.
No suspicious patterns detected.