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Security audit

Lead Generation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed lead-generation workflow that uses Xpoz MCP and local notes to find social-media prospects, with a normal supply-chain caution around its npm helper.

Before installing, confirm you trust the Xpoz service and mcporter package, and prefer a pinned or reviewed package version where available. Expect the skill to use your Xpoz account, query indexed social conversations, and store local lead-generation notes for reuse.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party npm Dependency

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 15
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

json
"install": [{"id": "node", "kind": "node", "package": "mcporter", "bins": ["mcporter"], "label": "Install mcporter (npm)"}],

Technical Analysis

The installation metadata specifies the npm package mcporter without an exact version or integrity hash. Consequently, installation may resolve to whichever package release is current at that time rather than the release reviewed with this skill.

This creates a supply-chain risk because the installed implementation can change independently of the audited project. If the npm package, its publisher account, or one of its transitive dependencies is compromised, malicious code could be delivered during a later installation. Applicable npm lifecycle scripts may execute during installation.

The project contains no direct evidence that mcporter is currently malicious. The finding concerns mutable and insufficiently verified dependency resolution.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the mcporter npm publisher, package, or a dependency used by a newly published release.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the expected package name.
  3. A user installs the skill after that release becomes the version selected by npm.
  4. The unpinned declaration resolves to the attacker-controlled release.
  5. npm downloads the malicious package and may execute its lifecycle scripts.
  6. The payload runs with the permissions of the account performing the installation.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code with the installing user's privileges. Depending on those privileges and the environment, this could expose files, environment variables, credentials available to the process, and network-accessible resources. It could also modify user-writable files or install further malicious components.

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Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin mcporter to a reviewed, exact version rather than relying on mutable package resolution.
  2. Use a lockfile that records exact transitive dependency versions and npm integrity hashes.
  3. Verify the package publisher, registry origin, release provenance, and signatures where supported.
  4. Review the pinned package and its transitive dependencies for lifecycle scripts and known vulnerabilities.
  5. Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation where operationally feasible, enabling only explicitly audited installation steps.
  6. Perform dependency installation in a least-privileged, isolated environment with restricted filesystem, credential, and network access.
  7. Add automated dependency monitoring, but require review and testing before accepting updated versions.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.