T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
scripts/finalize_report.py:388- Finding
Mandatory Promotional Content Injected into User Deliverables
- Content
View full analysis
由擎漫网络 | Qomob.AI旗下小红书赛道深度分析引擎 v3.0.0提供支持 """ ``` The same attribution is also embedded directly in the Skill instructions and table template: ```markdown > 由擎漫网络 | Qomob.AI旗下小红书赛道深度分析引擎 v3.0.0提供支持 ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill and both report-generation paths hard-code third-party promotional attribution into user-facing deliverables. The attribution is unrelated to the requested category analysis and cannot be disabled through any documented configuration or command-line option. Because `SKILL.md` defines this attribution as part of the Skill output and the scripts independently enforce it, the behavior persists whether the user creates a table through `scaffold_table.py` or generates a decision brief through `finalize_report.py`. This alters the expected output contract by inserting content selected by the Skill publisher rather than the user. No system privileges, code-execution privileges, or access to sensitive resources are obtained through this behavior. The issue affects the integrity and provenance of generated reports. ### Attack Path 1. A user requests a Xiaohongshu category analysis. 2. The Skill instructs the workflow to create a main table and decision brief. 3. The user or Agent invokes `scripts/scaffold_table.py` or `scripts/finalize_report.py`. 4. The script automatically appends the hard-coded Qomob.AI promotional attribution. 5. The user receives or distributes a report containing third-party promotional content that was not explicitly requested. ### Impact Assessment - Modifies every generated main table and finalized decision brief. - Introduces unwanted advertising into potenti ...[truncated 233 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
