T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
.workbuddy/memory/2026-08-28.md:1- Finding
Private Development Memory and Maintainer Metadata Included in the Artifact
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
.workbuddy/memory/2026-08-28.md, lines 1–23
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive development metadata exposure
Risk Level: MediumEvidence
markdown # 2026-08-28 ## SkillForge specification audit — ex-clapback-writing-style - Audit this skill using SkillForge Audit-Only (L3+L4+L5). ... ## Push to GitHub - Target repository: https://github.com/qomob/ex-clapback-writing-style (org: qomob, gh logged in, protocol https). - Process: directory was not originally a git repository → `git init -b main` → add remote → fetch discovered remote main already had an initial commit (v1.1.0 original, without frontmatter). - Committed local fixes as `4f2b98b`, then `git merge -X ours origin/main --allow-unrelated-histories` ... merge commit `fc74299`. ... - Push successful: `8ed7312..fc74299 main -> main`, remote HEAD = fc74299.The repository itself states that this directory is private and must not be published:
gitignore # Local tooling / private memory — never publish .workbuddy/An additional public-facing audit artifact exposes a local maintainer path:
markdown > Audit target: `/Users/jonki/Desktop/skill/ex-clapback-writing-style`Technical Analysis
The packaged artifact contains an agent/tool memory file that the project explicitly identifies as private. The file discloses internal development history, repository ownership, Git workflow, commit identifiers, tooling state, and the fact that the GitHub CLI was authenticated during development.
skillforge-audit.mdadditionally reveals a local account name through an absolute filesystem path.No password, access token, private key, session cookie, or other directly reusable credential was found. The statement that GitHub CLI was logged in does not expose its authentication material, and the Skill contains no mechanism that reads or transmits these files at runtime. The issue is therefore an information-disclosure and packaging-hygiene weak ...[truncated 1349 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
.workbuddy/from the distributed artifact and all release archives. - Purge previously published copies from package releases and repository history where practical.
- Replace absolute local paths in public reports with neutral project-relative paths.
- Remove Git authentication-state notes, internal commit workflow details, and other nonessential operational metadata from release artifacts.
- Build releases from an explicit allowlist, such as:
SKILL.mdruntime.md- Required files under
style/,references/, andtests/ - Sanitized public documentation
- Add a CI release gate that rejects:
.workbuddy/and other memory/state directories- Absolute home-directory paths
- Credential-like strings
- Private keys, tokens, cookies, and environment dumps
- Editor, agent, and local tooling state
- Verify the final archive contents after packaging rather than relying solely on
.gitignore, since ignore rules do not automatically exclude files from every packaging process. - Credential rotation is not required based on the audited content alone. Rotate credentials only if a broader review discovers authentication material in prior releases or repository history.
- Remove
