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Security audit

ByteTech

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is purpose-aligned but should be reviewed because it can reuse a live Chrome login session to read authenticated ByteTech/Feishu content and permits under-scoped tooling.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the agent use your authenticated Chrome session for ByteTech and Feishu. Prefer an isolated Chrome profile with only the needed accounts, avoid broad technical-article triggers, pin the MCP package version, and require explicit confirmation before fetching full Feishu bodies or inspecting/saving network request details.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:161
Finding

Overly Broad Access to the User's Shared Browser Session and Network Data

Content
View full analysis
mcporter call chrome-devtools.get_network_request reqid= responseFilePath=/tmp/response.json ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill connects directly to the user's existing Chrome instance and inherits its authenticated state. The documented commands can enumerate all open pages, list network requests, retrieve complete request details, and save responses to disk. The declared function only requires retrieving specific ByteTech article metadata and associated Lark document content. Enumerating every browser page and allowing unrestricted retrieval of network requests is broader than necessary. If the shared browser context contains unrelated tabs or requests, the Agent may access sensitive information such as: - Browsing history and private page URLs - Authentication or authorization headers - Session cookies and CSRF tokens - Private API request and response bodies - Personal or corporate information from unrelated applications The project does not contain instructions to transmit this information to an attacker-controlled endpoint. Nevertheless, allowing unrestricted inspection of a shared authenticated browser violates least-privilege principles and exposes unrelated data to the Agent context. ### Attack Path 1. The user starts the Skill while Chrome contains authenticated ByteTech, Lark, or unrelated application sessions. 2. The Skill connects to the existing browser context through Chrome DevTools. 3. `list_pages` exposes all open pages rather than selecting an isolated Byt ...[truncated 1073 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:4
Finding

Automatic Execution of an Unpinned Latest-Version Dependency

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (11)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The description states that the skill connects directly to the user's local Chrome and reuses login state, but it does not prominently warn that this inherits cookies and authenticated access to account-bound content. This missing disclosure is dangerous because users may not realize the skill can access private ByteTech/Feishu resources using their active browser session.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the operator to use undeclared tooling (lark-cli) to access Feishu document bodies, which materially expands capability beyond the approved tool list. This bypasses the manifest's security boundary and enables extraction of full document contents from an authenticated account, not just article metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The batch workflow again relies on undeclared lark-cli plus ad hoc Node processing to fetch and transform full Feishu document content. In context, this makes the skill more dangerous because it operationalizes bulk authenticated extraction and post-processing of potentially sensitive internal content outside the manifest's approved tool boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest-level MCP reference is effectively unpinned and relies on @latest, creating a supply-chain risk at the trust boundary of the skill. Because this skill is specifically designed to reuse the user's Chrome login state for ByteTech and Feishu access, any unexpected package change could immediately expose account-bound content and session-derived data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes broad phrases such as '技术文章' and '整理 bytetech', which can match normal user requests and invoke a high-privilege workflow unexpectedly. In this skill's context, accidental activation is more dangerous because the workflow reuses local Chrome login state and can access authenticated ByteTech and Feishu data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill allows execution of npx -y chrome-devtools-mcp@latest, which fetches and runs whatever code is current at execution time. In a skill that connects to the user's live Chrome session and inherits cookies/login state, a compromised or malicious package update could gain access to authenticated browser data and perform high-risk actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs operators to use lark-cli to fetch Feishu document contents, even though that tool is outside the declared Chrome DevTools-based scope. This expands data access to another authenticated system and can cause the agent/operator to retrieve sensitive document contents through an unreviewed tool path not covered by the skill manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The reference documentation exposes OAuth client details and concrete cookie names/values that are not necessary for a normal article-retrieval skill description. In this skill’s context, which explicitly relies on Chrome DevTools MCP, login-state reuse, and traffic inspection, those details materially lower the barrier to session abuse, unauthorized API replay, and misuse of internal authenticated resources.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This script uses a persisted local browser session to access authenticated ByteTech/Lark content and then prints the remote document body directly to stdout, with no confirmation, scope restriction, redaction, or warning to the user. In this skill’s context, that is dangerous because it explicitly reuses the user’s logged-in Chrome state to retrieve potentially private internal documents, creating a clear risk of unintended data disclosure into agent outputs, logs, or downstream tools.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

This markdown file contains user-facing natural-language content exclusively in Chinese, including headings and operational descriptions, but does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide an opt-in language choice. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a single language without user choice can be a policy violation unless clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script's comments, usage guidance, error hint, and user-facing output are written in Chinese only. This imposes a specific language on users without any opt-in or indication that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.