T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:161- Finding
Overly Broad Access to the User's Shared Browser Session and Network Data
- Content
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mcporter call chrome-devtools.get_network_request reqid= responseFilePath=/tmp/response.json ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill connects directly to the user's existing Chrome instance and inherits its authenticated state. The documented commands can enumerate all open pages, list network requests, retrieve complete request details, and save responses to disk. The declared function only requires retrieving specific ByteTech article metadata and associated Lark document content. Enumerating every browser page and allowing unrestricted retrieval of network requests is broader than necessary. If the shared browser context contains unrelated tabs or requests, the Agent may access sensitive information such as: - Browsing history and private page URLs - Authentication or authorization headers - Session cookies and CSRF tokens - Private API request and response bodies - Personal or corporate information from unrelated applications The project does not contain instructions to transmit this information to an attacker-controlled endpoint. Nevertheless, allowing unrestricted inspection of a shared authenticated browser violates least-privilege principles and exposes unrelated data to the Agent context. ### Attack Path 1. The user starts the Skill while Chrome contains authenticated ByteTech, Lark, or unrelated application sessions. 2. The Skill connects to the existing browser context through Chrome DevTools. 3. `list_pages` exposes all open pages rather than selecting an isolated Byt ...[truncated 1073 chars]- Remediation
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