T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:102- Finding
Unpinned Package Execution in Installation Instructions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md, lines 102–105
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package execution
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash # ClawHub ecosystem (OpenClaw / QClaw / WorkBuddy) npx clawhub@latest install Qiu-Difeng/solo-forgeTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command instructs users to execute the mutable
latestrelease of the third-partyclawhubpackage throughnpx. Because neither an exact package version nor an integrity hash is specified, the package executed during installation may differ from the version reviewed when this Skill was audited.npxcan download and execute package code locally. Consequently, compromise of the package publisher, package registry, release pipeline, or a futurelatestrelease could introduce arbitrary behavior into the documented installation process.The repository itself contains no evidence that the current
clawhubpackage is malicious. The issue is the absence of dependency pinning and integrity verification, which creates a supply-chain trust boundary outside the audited project.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
clawhubpackage publisher account, registry entry, or release pipeline. - The attacker publishes a malicious release that becomes the package's
latestversion. - A user follows the installation instructions and runs
npx clawhub@latest install Qiu-Difeng/solo-forge. npxretrieves and executes the attacker-controlled package release.- The malicious package performs actions with the operating-system privileges of the user running the command.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. Depending on that account's permissions and the malicious package behavior, the attacker could access or modify user-readable files, steal local credentials, alter installed Agent skills or configuration, execute network requests, o ...[truncated 246 chars]
- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace
@latestwith an exact, reviewed package version:bash npx clawhub@X.Y.Z install Qiu-Difeng/solo-forge - Document the expected package publisher and official registry source so users can identify namespace substitution or registry redirection.
- Publish and verify a cryptographic integrity value or signed release artifact before execution.
- Use a lockfile or equivalent immutable dependency record where the installation environment supports one.
- Establish a controlled process for reviewing and deliberately updating the pinned version.
- Advise users not to run the installer with administrator or root privileges unless strictly required.
- Where practical, offer a non-executing installation method based on a pinned commit or signed release archive.
- Replace
