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Security audit

Ppt Generator Template

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent PPT-to-HTML generator, but its generated presentations can execute injected browser script when given untrusted content.

Review before installing if you may generate presentations from untrusted or externally supplied text. Treat the generated HTML as active content, avoid hosting it on a sensitive origin, and prefer a version that escapes slide text and validates color options.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
index.js:78
Finding

Unsanitized Presentation Data Enables HTML and CSS Injection

Content
View full analysis
${config.title} ``` ```js body { font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; background: ${config.backgroundColor}; color: ${config.textColor}; height: 100vh; overflow: hidden; } ``` ```js h1 { font-size: 4rem; font-weight: 700; margin-bottom: 20px; letter-spacing: -0.02em; color: ${config.accentColor}; } ``` ```js button { background: ${config.accentColor}; color: white; border: none; padding: 12px 24px; font-size: 1.2rem; border-radius: 8px; cursor: pointer; margin: 0 10px; transition: opacity 0.2s; } ``` The author and slide content are also rendered as raw markup: ```js
${config.author}
Slide 1 of ${slides.length}
${slides.map((slide, index) => `
${slide.type === 'title' ? `

${slide.content}

` : slide.type === 'bullets' ? `

${slide.title}

    ${slide.content.split(/[•\-*]/).filter(item => item.trim()).map(item => `
  • ${item.trim()}
  • `).join('')}
` : `

${slide.title}

${slide.content}

`}
`).join('')}
``` ### Technical Analysis `generatePPT()` accepts presentation content and an `options` object. These inputs flow into `gener ...[truncated 2542 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
`, `"`, and `'` before inserting titles, authors, slide content, and bullet items into the template. ```js function escapeHTML(value) { return String(value) .replaceAll('&', '&') .replaceAll('<', '<') .replaceAll('>', '>') .replaceAll('"', '"') .replaceAll("'", '''); } ``` Apply this function independently to every value rendered as text. Do not escape the completed HTML document as a whole. 2. **Strictly validate CSS configuration values.** Use an allowlist for accepted color formats rather than inserting arbitrary strings. For example, accept only normalized hexadecimal colors if that meets the feature requirements: ```js function validateHexColor(value, fallback) { return typeof value === 'string' && /^#[0-9a-fA-F]{6}$/.test(value) ? value : fallback; } ``` 3. **Prefer safe DOM construction where practical.** Create content nodes and assign untrusted values through `textContent`. If limited markup is intentionally supported, process it with a reputable sanitizer configured with a minimal element and attribute allowlist. Event-handler attributes, script-capable URLs, `
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger example is broad enough to auto-activate on a common request like creating a PPT about any topic, without clear scope limits, confirmation, or namespace constraints. In agent environments, overly broad triggers can cause unintended skill invocation, routing user content into this skill when another tool or a safer/manual path was intended.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The HTML template hard-codes lang="zh-CN", which imposes a specific language/locale on all generated presentations. The file does not offer a user opt-in or configuration option for locale, and there is no clear region-specific justification documented here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill description and usage example are written entirely in Chinese, including the implied user invocation phrase, with no indication that other languages are supported or that Chinese is a justified locale restriction. This can constitute a language policy issue because it implicitly fixes the interaction language without opt-in or documented rationale.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This file sets the document language to zh-CN and presents the skill name, description, and usage example entirely in Chinese. The policy allows locale constraints only when users are given a choice or the restriction is clearly justified; neither is present here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.