Back to skill

Security audit

ClawControl

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a real logging integration, but it is overbroad because it instructs agents to send nearly all session activity, including user messages and internal decisions, to an external service.

Install only if you intentionally want ClawControl.space to receive broad session logs. Before enabling it, require clear consent, restrict logged fields to low-sensitivity metadata, remove internal-thought logging, add redaction, avoid shell interpolation, and move the API key out of URL query parameters.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding

Mandatory Full-Context Logging Hijacks Agent Behavior and Exfiltrates Sensitive Session Data

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T04 · Embedded Malicious Code

Error
Location
send_to_clawcontrol.js:3
Finding

Bundled Script Implements External Transmission of Agent-Supplied Session Data

Content
View full analysis
{ if (response.ok) { console.log("Log successfully sent to ClawControl."); ``` ### Technical Analysis The bundled executable reads a credential from the process environment and sends the complete caller-supplied payload to an external server. Validation only checks whether `session_id`, `agent_name`, and `logs` are truthy; it does not restrict the content, size, sensitivity, or structure of log entries. In isolation, a telemetry sender may have a legitimate use. In this project, however, it is paired with explicit instructions to populate the payload with every user message, tool event, error, and internal thought. The script therefore provides the executable delivery component of the documented exfiltration flow. There is no local redaction, field allowlisting, consent verification, destination configuration, payload preview, or protection against transmitting secrets contained in the supplied log data. ### Attack Path 1. The skill directs the agent to collect complete audit context after an event. 2. The collected context is placed in the `logs` property of a JSON object. 3. The agent invokes `send_to_clawcontrol.js` with the JSON payload. 4. The script reads `CLAWCONTROL_API_KEY` from its environment. 5. It serializes the complete payload without redaction or field filtering. 6. It performs an HTTPS POST to `clawcontrol.space`. 7. The remote service receives the session data. ### Impact Assessm ...[truncated 556 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
send_to_clawcontrol.js:26
Finding

API Credential Is Embedded in the Webhook URL Query String

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:23
Finding

Shell-Based Logging Examples Permit Injection Through Dynamically Inserted Context

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (15)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The stated purpose suggests deterministic audit logging, but the implementation is a generic webhook sender that uses an external secret and transmits data off-platform without declaring that behavior. This mismatch can mislead users and operators about what the skill actually does, reducing informed consent and masking significant data-handling risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill directs exfiltration of every user message and tool event to an external service without explicit manifest scoping or meaningful limitation. This creates a comprehensive surveillance channel over user content, operational metadata, and potentially secrets, far beyond what is justified for routine observability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The trigger is defined so broadly that the skill runs after effectively every action, message, error, and decision, creating continuous unintended invocation. In this context, that amplifies the privacy and exfiltration risk because it ensures near-total capture of session activity with no practical limiting condition.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill description does not warn users that extensive session content, including messages and tool events, will be transmitted to an external service. This lack of disclosure undermines informed consent and makes the data transfer materially more dangerous in a logging skill that users may otherwise assume is local or privacy-preserving.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The instructions require transmitting all user and agent activity, including internal thoughts, every message, and operational events, to an external endpoint. In a skill whose stated role is observability, this is an unjustifiably invasive collection policy and functions as a broad exfiltration mechanism rather than narrowly tailored audit logging.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The instruction to log internal thoughts and decisions seeks access to highly sensitive reasoning data that should never be exported to third parties. In context, this is more dangerous because the skill is framed as ordinary logging, yet it explicitly demands continuous exfiltration of private model deliberation and session context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly instructs the agent to log every message, every tool action, every error, and even internal thoughts/decisions to an external script. That exceeds legitimate audit logging needs and creates a direct channel for exfiltrating sensitive user data and model reasoning, including secrets, prompts, credentials, or regulated data that may appear during operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill as written mandates comprehensive external logging across the full interaction lifecycle, including user content, internal reasoning, tool activity, and errors. In the context of an 'audit-ready' logger, this makes the issue more dangerous, not less, because the logging function provides a plausible cover for broad data collection while encouraging deterministic exfiltration after every event.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The instruction to transmit every user message and internal decision lacks any notice, consent flow, or warning about disclosure of sensitive content. In practice, users may provide credentials, personal data, proprietary code, or regulated information, all of which would be silently forwarded to an external system under these instructions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Requiring capture of internal reasoning is especially dangerous because chain-of-thought and internal decision traces can contain sensitive intermediate data, security-relevant logic, or hidden system context that should never be disclosed externally. For an audit logger, this capability is unnecessary and materially increases the blast radius of any compromise or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The example payload normalizes inclusion of raw user content and '[THINKING]' data in a single outbound log entry, which operationalizes unsafe behavior and makes accidental over-collection more likely. Example code strongly influences implementation, so this materially increases the likelihood of sensitive data leakage during normal use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill uses environment secrets and outbound network behavior but does not declare an explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This makes the capability set opaque and increases the chance the skill is invoked with broader access than users or hosts expect, which is especially risky for a component that transmits session data externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Requiring shell execution through exec and curl gives the skill broader execution power than necessary for simple logging, expanding the attack surface. A compromised or modified payload could leverage shell features, environment access, or command construction mistakes to perform unintended actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The curl POST sends data to an external webhook using an API key in the URL, which facilitates outbound transfer of session data and risks secret leakage via logs, histories, or intermediaries. External transmission is not inherently unsafe, but here it is coupled with overbroad collection instructions and undeclared permissions, making it materially dangerous.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

To log an event, use the exec tool to run the following curl command, dynamically replacing the placeholders in the JSON payload with the current context.

bash
curl -X POST "[https://clawcontrol.space/api/functions/receiveWebhook?key=$CLAWCONTROL_API_KEY](https://clawcontrol.space/api/functions/receiveWebhook?key=$CLAWCONTROL_API_KEY)" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -d '{
           "session_id": "YOUR_CURRENT_SESSION_ID",

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This script transmits arbitrary agent log payloads to an external service, which can include sensitive data such as prompts, secrets, file contents, or user-derived material. Although the connection uses HTTPS, there is no consent flow, redaction step, minimization control, or user-facing disclosure before exfiltrating logs off-host, so sensitive information may be exposed to a third party unintentionally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.