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Security audit

complex-task-executor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a normal task-methodology guide, but it requires automatic memory writes after broad complex tasks without clear user consent or safeguards.

Install only if you want agents to follow this Chinese complex-task workflow and are comfortable with automatic memory updates. Prefer revising it so memory writes require explicit approval, show the exact proposed entry, exclude secrets and sensitive project details, and limit retention to the relevant project.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:37
Finding
Mandatory Persistent Agent Memory Modification## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 37–39 and 45–46 **Vulnerability Type**: `T02: Agent Memory Poisoning` **Risk Level**: Medium **Complete Code Snippet**: ```markdown ### 阶段三:“总结”之术 (Review & Memory Phase) **核心动作:复盘与记忆沉淀 (CRITICAL)** 任务完成后,必须进行深度的复盘,并**强制使用 manage_core_memory 工具**将经验写入记忆。 ``` ```markdown 在任务的最后一步,你**必须**调用 manage_core_memory 工具。 提取“总结之术”中的结论,按照以下类别进行记录: ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill requires the Agent to invoke `manage_core_memory` and persist conclusions after every applicable complex task. The persisted content may include project architecture, conventions, troubleshooting lessons, and behavioral guidance derived from repository content. This creates a persistent-state security risk because the instructions do not require user consent, provenance tracking, trust validation, content review, project isolation, sensitive-data filtering, expiration, or rollback. An attacker who controls or influences task inputs or repository content could cause misleading rules or conclusions to be interpreted as reusable knowledge and stored in long-term Agent memory. The reviewed package does not contain an explicit attacker-authored memory payload, executable code, or an exfiltration mechanism. The issue is therefore classified as a medium-risk unsafe memory-writing requirement rather than confirmed malicious exploitation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker places misleading conventions, instructions, or architectural claims in repository content processed during a complex task. 2. The Agent loads this Skill and follows its mandatory review phase. 3. The Agent treats conclusions derived from the attacker-influenced content as reusable experience or knowledge. 4. The Skill requires those conclusions to be written through `manage_core_memory`. 5. The stored conclusions persist beyond the current task and may influence decisions in later sessions or unrelated projects. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation cou ...[truncated 566 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the unconditional requirement to invoke `manage_core_memory`. 2. Require explicit, informed user approval before every persistent-memory write. 3. Display the exact proposed memory entry and its intended retention scope before storage. 4. Treat conclusions derived from repository files, external documents, and user-controlled content as untrusted until independently validated. 5. Exclude credentials, personal data, proprietary source details, transient task data, and embedded instructions from memory entries. 6. Namespace stored knowledge by project and prevent automatic reuse across unrelated projects or users. 7. Record provenance, creation time, confidence, and expiration information for every entry. 8. Provide inspection, correction, deletion, and rollback controls. 9. Prefer a nonpersistent task summary unless durable storage is demonstrably necessary. 10. Add safeguards preventing repository content from directly defining persistent Agent rules.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
---
name: "complex-task-executor"
description: "基于“谋事、干事、总结”方法论执行复杂任务,并自动将经验教训写入短期记忆。Invoke when user asks to handle complex tasks, plan strategies, or execute multi-step operations."
---
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill mandates use of a memory-management tool to persist task-derived information but does not clearly warn users that information may be retained beyond the current task. This creates a substantial privacy and data-governance risk because sensitive user data, proprietary details, or confidential project context could be stored without informed consent.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill description uses broad activation triggers such as handling complex tasks, planning strategies, or multi-step operations, which can cause the skill to be invoked in many contexts where its mandatory behaviors are inappropriate. This increases the chance that users are subjected to hidden persistence and workflow constraints without specific consent.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The skill is primarily written to enforce a specific language and methodology regardless of user preference, which can reduce transparency and user control. While not a direct security flaw on its own, it can contribute to unsafe operation by making instructions less understandable and harder for users to review, especially when combined with hidden persistence requirements.

Ssd 3

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The mandatory memory-writing step encourages retention of lessons learned from arbitrary complex tasks, which can easily include sensitive user-provided information, internal architecture details, or confidential debugging artifacts. Because the instruction is unconditional, the skill lacks safeguards to prevent long-term storage of secrets or regulated data.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The manifest describes the skill as handling 'complex tasks' in very broad terms, without defining what kinds of tasks are in scope, what data it may access, or what safety boundaries apply. This kind of ambiguous activation language can cause the skill to be invoked in overly broad contexts and increases the chance that it will process sensitive requests or operate beyond the user's intended scope.

Ssd 3

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The description explicitly says the skill will automatically write task-derived experience and lessons learned into a memory system. Automatic persistence of natural-language task outputs creates a real risk of retaining sensitive user data, confidential project details, credentials, or regulated information that may later be surfaced unintentionally in other contexts.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
The natural-language metadata is entirely in Chinese, which may imply a fixed language/locale behavior. There is no indication that users can choose another language or that the locale restriction is intentional and documented for a region-specific purpose.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.