ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Reddit Quote Carousel Topaz

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it describes, but it can upload images to external services, push them to a repository, and publish branded content to Instagram without a clear approval checkpoint.

Install only if you intend this skill to use your Topaz, GitHub/repository, and Instagram credentials for an end-to-end publishing workflow. Review every generated image, caption, destination account, repository change, and public URL before allowing upload, git push, or Instagram publication, and be aware that images may be processed by Topaz and temporarily or permanently exposed through repository hosting or social media.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:107
Finding

Forced Third-Party Promotion in Automatically Published Content

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly uploads locally stored images to Topaz Labs, but it does not disclose that those images are transmitted to a third-party service outside the local workflow. This creates a real data-handling and privacy risk because images may contain copyrighted, sensitive, or operationally restricted content, and users are not given a chance to approve or opt out of that external transfer.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This command sends a local image file to the Topaz Labs API, which is a direct external transmission of locally obtained content. In this skill's context, that transmission is expected for functionality, but it is still security-relevant because it moves data off-box to a third party using credentials retrieved from the local keychain.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

md
TOPAZ_API_KEY=$(security find-generic-password -s "topaz-api-key" -w)

curl --request POST \
  --url https://api.topazlabs.com/image/v1/enhance \
  --header "X-API-Key: ${TOPAZ_API_KEY}" \
  --header 'accept: image/jpeg' \
  --header 'content-type: multipart/form-data' \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The async enhancement submission also transmits local image content to Topaz Labs and initiates remote processing tied to an API key. While not overtly malicious, it expands the external data-sharing surface and can expose content to third-party handling without an explicit authorization step.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Submit async
RESPONSE=$(curl -s --request POST \
  --url https://api.topazlabs.com/image/v1/enhance/async \
  --header "X-API-Key: ${TOPAZ_API_KEY}" \
  --header 'content-type: multipart/form-data' \
  --form 'model=Low Resolution V2' \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

md
# Poll until Completed
while true; do
  STATUS=$(curl -s --header "X-API-Key: ${TOPAZ_API_KEY}" \
    "https://api.topazlabs.com/image/v1/status/${PROCESS_ID}" | jq -r '.status')
  [ "$STATUS" = "Completed" ] && break
  sleep 3
done

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

md
# Poll until Completed
while true; do
  STATUS=$(curl -s --header "X-API-Key: ${TOPAZ_API_KEY}" \
    "https://api.topazlabs.com/image/v1/status/${PROCESS_ID}" | jq -r '.status')
  [ "$STATUS" = "Completed" ] && break
  sleep 3
done

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow culminates in publishing generated content to Instagram and hosting images in a repository, but it does not require an explicit confirmation before public posting or describe cleanup failure modes. That is dangerous because it can cause unintended public disclosure, persistence of media in Git history or remote hosting, and accidental publication under a real account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.