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Security audit

telethon-plus

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a powerful Telegram account control tool, but its high-impact access and risks are clearly disclosed and aligned with its purpose.

Install only if you intentionally want an agent to operate a real Telegram account. Run it on a trusted local or TLS-protected endpoint, set TELETHON_AUTH_KEY, keep the session string private, use read-only or dry-run mode when possible, and do not enable TELETHON_POST_TO_URL or pass file_url values unless you fully trust the destination and source.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
caption="$*"
    body=$(jq -n --arg chat "$chat" --arg url "$url" --arg cap "$caption" \
      '{chat:$chat, file_url:$url} + (if $cap == "" then {} else {text:$cap} end)')
    curl -fsS -X POST "${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
      -d "$body" "$URL/api/messages"
    ;;
  delete)
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
This endpoint forwards an arbitrary file_url to the backend, which may cause the telethon-plus service to fetch remote content on behalf of the user. In the context of a full Telegram userbot control plane, that can enable SSRF-style access from the server to internal resources or unintended transmission of sensitive network-reachable content through a high-privilege account workflow.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.