Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly coherent for managing SSH tunnels, but its install instructions ask users to pipe a mutable remote script directly into bash without integrity verification.
Install only if you are comfortable reviewing the upstream repository and SSH tunnel rules yourself. Avoid the pipe-to-bash command; prefer downloading a pinned release or source checkout, inspecting it, and verifying integrity before running. Treat reverse tunnels as exposing local services to remote hosts, keep SSH keys and rule files private, and use the current-user install path unless system-wide installation is truly needed.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Host 1: expose a local web app on the VPS (reverse), and reach the VPS's
# internal Postgres from your machine (forward).
deploy@vps1.example.com:22=/home/user/.ssh/deploy_vps1
reverse 0.0.0.0:8080:localhost:3000
forward localhost:15432:127.0.0.1:5432
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Host 1: expose a local web app on the VPS (reverse), and reach the VPS's
# internal Postgres from your machine (forward).
deploy@vps1.example.com:22=/home/user/.ssh/deploy_vps1
reverse 0.0.0.0:8080:localhost:3000
forward localhost:15432:127.0.0.1:5432
The command chains network retrieval directly into shell execution with '| bash', eliminating any review boundary between untrusted input and command execution. This makes exploitation straightforward if the upstream script is altered, because the user's shell will immediately execute the attacker's payload.
wget -qO- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/psyb0t/ssh-tunnel-swarm/master/tools/downloader.sh | bash
This drops an executable ssh-tunnel-swarm bash script in the current
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
nd chmod +x's it (a merged single-file build, NOT a compiled binary). It checks for jq/wget first and exits with an error
message if either is missing.
Then install it somewhere on PATH:
All users:
sudo mv ssh-tunnel-swarm /usr/local/bin/
Current user only:
mkdir -p ~/bin
mv ssh-tunnel-swarm ~/bin/
If ~/bin isn't already on PATH, add it:
echo 'export PATH="$HOME/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc # or ~/.zshrc for zsh
source ~/.bashrc
Check first: echo $PATH | grep -q "$HOME/bin" && echo already-on-path || echo not-on-path
Clone the repo (default branch master) and build the merged single-file script via
the Makefile:
git clone https://github.com/psyb0t/ssh-tunnel-swarm.git
cd ssh-tunnel-swarm
make build
make build concatenates logger.sh, validators.sh, rules.sh, splitters.sh,
main.sh (stripping source lines, comments, and blank lines) into
`build/ssh-tunnel-sw
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
in `known_hosts` or the connection fails. That's intentional; don't work around it by
disabling host key checking.
- No password auth support — private key only. Keep the key file permissions tight
(`chmod 600`) and never put keys or the rules file (which references key paths) in a
world-readable location or a git repo.
- Every connection block runs forever in a retry loop (5s backoff) until you kill it —
make sure that's actually what you want before pointing this at a host.
Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
disabling host key checking.
- No password auth support — private key only. Keep the key file permissions tight
(`chmod 600`) and never put keys or the rules file (which references key paths) in a
world-readable location or a git repo.
- Every connection block runs forever in a retry loop (5s backoff) until you kill it —
make sure that's actually what you want before pointing this at a host.
The setup instructions tell users to stream a remote script directly into bash, which executes unreviewed code immediately with no integrity check, pinning, or manual inspection step. This creates a strong supply-chain and content-tampering risk: if the GitHub content, account, branch, or network path is compromised, arbitrary shell commands will run on the user's machine.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
All users:
sudo mv ssh-tunnel-swarm /usr/local/bin/
Current user only:
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
Current user only:
mkdir -p ~/bin
mv ssh-tunnel-swarm ~/bin/
The documentation instructs users to fetch and execute an external script from the internet, relying on live remote content at install time. Even apart from the pipe-to-bash pattern, external script fetching from a mutable source increases supply-chain exposure and makes the installation path dependent on third-party infrastructure trust.
wget -qO- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/psyb0t/ssh-tunnel-swarm/master/tools/downloader.sh | bash
This drops an executable ssh-tunnel-swarm bash script in the current
No suspicious patterns detected.