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Security audit

go-vectara

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent documentation skill for using an unofficial Go Vectara API client, with credential and mutating API behavior disclosed and scoped to user-requested use.

Install only if you want Codex to help with Go code that uses this unofficial Vectara client. Provide Vectara credentials through environment variables or your normal secret handling, and review any account-changing operations such as create, update, delete, reset, API-key, user, agent, or tool actions before approving them.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

md
Set `x-api-key` with `req.Header.Set("x-api-key", os.Getenv("VECTARA_API_KEY"))` in a request editor.

OAuth client credentials are exchanged at `https://auth.vectara.io/oauth2/token`. Send the access token as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Token acquisition and renewal belong to the caller. The spec also has a distinct `GetOAuthToken` operation at `/oauth/token`; do not assume it is the security scheme's token URL.

`VisitorToken` uses `X-Visitor-Id`, carrying the encrypted token returned by visitor creation. `FederatedSignIn` uses a bearer token from a registered trusted issuer. Only operations declaring these schemes accept them.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
Set `x-api-key` with `req.Header.Set("x-api-key", os.Getenv("VECTARA_API_KEY"))` in a request editor.

OAuth client credentials are exchanged at `https://auth.vectara.io/oauth2/token`. Send the access token as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Token acquisition and renewal belong to the caller. The spec also has a distinct `GetOAuthToken` operation at `/oauth/token`; do not assume it is the security scheme's token URL.

`VisitorToken` uses `X-Visitor-Id`, carrying the encrypted token returned by visitor creation. `FederatedSignIn` uses a bearer token from a registered trusted issuer. Only operations declaring these schemes accept them.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

md
| Method | Endpoint |
| --- | --- |
| `ListCorporaWithResponse`, `CreateCorpusWithResponse` | `GET`, `POST /v2/corpora` |
| `GetCorpusWithResponse`, `UpdateCorpusWithResponse`, `DeleteCorpusWithResponse` | `GET`, `PATCH`, `DELETE /v2/corpora/{corpus_key}` |
| `ListCorpusDocumentsWithResponse`, `CreateCorpusDocumentWithResponse` | `GET`, `POST /v2/corpora/{corpus_key}/documents` |
| `SearchCorpusWithResponse`, `QueryCorpusWithResponse` | `GET`, `POST /v2/corpora/{corpus_key}/query` |
| `QueryWithResponse` | `POST /v2/query` |

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.