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Security audit

Go Trading212

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed Go helper for Trading 212 API use; it can support real-money trading actions, but it tells agents to default to demo and act only on explicit user requests.

Install only if you want a Go project to use Trading 212 through this unofficial client. Keep the API key and secret in environment variables, start with the demo host, and require clear confirmation before any live order placement, cancellation, or pie change.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Documenting a destructive endpoint that cancels orders by arbitrary {id} is dangerous in an agent-integrated skill because it enables direct state-changing financial actions if parameters are supplied incorrectly, maliciously, or without sufficient authorization checks. The surrounding context includes live trading support, which makes misuse materially harmful rather than merely theoretical.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
| `PlaceLimitOrderWithResponse` | `POST /api/v0/equity/orders/limit` |
| `PlaceStopOrder1WithResponse` | `POST /api/v0/equity/orders/stop` |
| `PlaceStopOrderWithResponse` | `POST /api/v0/equity/orders/stop_limit` |
| `CancelOrderWithResponse` | `DELETE /api/v0/equity/orders/{id}` |
| `Orders1WithResponse` | `GET /api/v0/equity/history/orders` |
| `DividendsWithResponse` | `GET /api/v0/equity/history/dividends` |
| `TransactionsWithResponse` | `GET /api/v0/equity/history/transactions` |

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The documented DELETE /api/v0/equity/pies/{id} endpoint allows destructive modification/removal of portfolio structures, and in an agent skill this can be abused through unsafe parameter handling or accidental invocation. While less immediately severe than direct order execution, it still permits unauthorized or unintended changes to investment configuration in a live account context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md
| `ExchangesWithResponse` | `GET /api/v0/equity/metadata/exchanges` |
| `InstrumentsWithResponse` | `GET /api/v0/equity/metadata/instruments` |
| `GetAllWithResponse`, `CreateWithResponse` | `GET`, `POST /api/v0/equity/pies` |
| `GetDetailedWithResponse`, `UpdateWithResponse`, `DeleteWithResponse` | `GET`, `POST`, `DELETE /api/v0/equity/pies/{id}` |
| `DuplicatePieWithResponse` | `POST /api/v0/equity/pies/{id}/duplicate` |

Request bodies: `MarketRequest`, `LimitRequest`, `StopRequest`, `StopLimitRequest`, `PieRequest`, `PublicReportRequest`.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The setup/reference documentation exposes both demo and live trading environments and enumerates real-money order placement and cancellation operations without prominent safety guidance, confirmation requirements, or warnings about destructive financial consequences. In an agent skill context, this lowers the barrier for unsafe automation and increases the chance that an agent or user invokes live-money actions accidentally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.