p-image-upscale

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 3, 2026 · 2:37 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.11

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Pruna image-upscaling helper, but users should understand it sends images to Pruna and suggests installing related unpinned skills.

Install only the related Pruna skills you actually need, review mutable npx install targets before running them, and do not upload confidential or sensitive images unless you are comfortable sending them to Pruna's external API under your API key.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (18)

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to execute `npx skills add ...` commands without pinning an immutable package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package or resolver path changes, a user may install and execute unintended code under the trusted `skills` workflow.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs uploading user images and invoking an external API but does not clearly warn that user-provided image data will leave the local environment and be processed by a third party. This can undermine informed consent and create privacy, confidentiality, or compliance issues, especially for sensitive or identifying images.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### Upload source image

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.pruna.ai/v1/files" \
  -H "apikey: ${PRUNA_API_KEY}" \
  -F "content=@/path/to/source.png"
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: This line explicitly uploads a local image file to an external service endpoint. External transmission is expected for the product's function, but without strong consent and data-handling guidance it remains a real privacy/security risk because user content may include sensitive or regulated information.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### Upload source image

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.pruna.ai/v1/files" \
  -H "apikey: ${PRUNA_API_KEY}" \
  -F "content=@/path/to/source.png"
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: This line explicitly uploads a local image file to an external service endpoint. External transmission is expected for the product's function, but without strong consent and data-handling guidance it remains a real privacy/security risk because user content may include sensitive or regulated information.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### Upload source image

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.pruna.ai/v1/files" \
  -H "apikey: ${PRUNA_API_KEY}" \
  -F "content=@/path/to/source.png"
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: This line explicitly uploads a local image file to an external service endpoint. External transmission is expected for the product's function, but without strong consent and data-handling guidance it remains a real privacy/security risk because user content may include sensitive or regulated information.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### Upload source image

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.pruna.ai/v1/files" \
  -H "apikey: ${PRUNA_API_KEY}" \
  -F "content=@/path/to/source.png"
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: This line explicitly uploads a local image file to an external service endpoint. External transmission is expected for the product's function, but without strong consent and data-handling guidance it remains a real privacy/security risk because user content may include sensitive or regulated information.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### Upload source image

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.pruna.ai/v1/files" \
  -H "apikey: ${PRUNA_API_KEY}" \
  -F "content=@/path/to/source.png"
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: This line explicitly uploads a local image file to an external service endpoint. External transmission is expected for the product's function, but without strong consent and data-handling guidance it remains a real privacy/security risk because user content may include sensitive or regulated information.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### Upload source image

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.pruna.ai/v1/files" \
  -H "apikey: ${PRUNA_API_KEY}" \
  -F "content=@/path/to/source.png"
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: This line explicitly uploads a local image file to an external service endpoint. External transmission is expected for the product's function, but without strong consent and data-handling guidance it remains a real privacy/security risk because user content may include sensitive or regulated information.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.