Host Hardening

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026 at 9:55 AM UTC
• Version:
  1.0.0

Overview

This appears to be a real host-hardening guide, but it also enables a persistent root OpenClaw gateway service and includes SSH/firewall steps that could lock a remote operator out if run as written.

Review before installing or following this skill on a remote server. Confirm key-based SSH works in a separate session, allow all needed firewall ports before enabling UFW, keep console or out-of-band access available, and avoid installing the OpenClaw gateway as a root, auto-restarting boot service unless you explicitly want that persistent service and have hardened it with least-privilege settings.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The skill’s stated purpose is host hardening, but it also creates and enables a persistent OpenClaw gateway systemd service. That materially expands scope from defensive configuration into application deployment and persistence, which can surprise operators and create an unnecessary always-on entrypoint or service footprint on the host.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The systemd unit runs `openclaw gateway` persistently as `root`, with `Restart=always` and boot-time enablement, even though this is unrelated to baseline hardening. A root-run, auto-restarting application service increases blast radius if the application is compromised and introduces privileged persistence under the guise of security setup.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The firewall instructions immediately switch the host to deny-by-default and enable UFW, but the warning about adding other required rules appears only afterward. On a remote system, this can interrupt management or application connectivity if SSH is nonstandard or if required service ports were not pre-authorized first.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The SSH hardening step disables password authentication and restarts SSH immediately without an upfront safety check. If key-based authentication is not already working for all required accounts, the operator can lock themselves out of the server.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.