Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
Host Hardening
v1.0.0Harden an OpenClaw Linux server with SSH key-only auth, UFW firewall, fail2ban brute-force protection, and credential permissions. Use when setting up a new...
⭐ 0· 423·0 current·0 all-time
MIT-0
Download zip
LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The name/description and the commands (SSH hardening, UFW, fail2ban, credential perms) are generally aligned. However the instructions assume Debian/Ubuntu (apt-get) and systemd without declaring that requirement; the skill metadata gives no OS restriction. The inclusion of an OpenClaw gateway systemd unit is consistent with the 'OpenClaw' context but expands scope from 'hardening' to 'service-installation'.
Instruction Scope
Commands perform system-wide, privileged operations: edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config, enable UFW, install packages, and create/enable a root systemd service. These are within 'hardening' but the instructions omit safety checks (no backup of sshd_config, no verification that the openclaw binary exists, no explicit advice to allow additional ports before enabling UFW). The credential permission change uses chmod 700 on a credentials file (700 gives execute permission and is unusual for secret files; 600 is normally appropriate). Creating a root-run, always-restarting openclaw-gateway service grants persistent privileged behavior that should be explicitly justified and reviewed.
Install Mechanism
This is an instruction-only skill with no installers or downloads. Nothing is written by the skill package itself; all changes are via system commands the user/agent would run. That minimizes supply-chain risk from the skill bundle itself.
Credentials
The skill declares no environment variables or credentials, which is consistent with being instruction-only. It does reference a local credential path (~/.openclaw/credentials) and creates a service using /root/.openclaw — that is reasonable for securing local credentials but the instructions do not clarify which user should run them (root vs non-root) and assume root-owned paths exist. The permission recommendation (700) is not the usual least-privilege choice for secret files.
Persistence & Privilege
The SKILL.md instructs creating and enabling a systemd service that runs as root and restarts always. That makes a persistent, privileged agent on the host; while enabling a gateway may be legitimate, it materially increases the long-term impact of following these instructions. The skill metadata does not require elevated privileges or warn that the commands require root.
What to consider before installing
This is an instruction-only hardening recipe that will make system-wide, privileged changes if you run it. Before running anything: 1) Confirm the target is Debian/Ubuntu with systemd (the guide uses apt-get and systemctl) — do not run on unsupported OSes. 2) Backup /etc/ssh/sshd_config (and other configs) before editing. 3) Verify you can log in with SSH keys from another session before disabling password auth. 4) Be careful enabling UFW remotely — add necessary allow rules (SSH and any service ports) first to avoid locking yourself out. 5) Prefer chmod 600 for credential files rather than 700; ensure you understand which user owns ~/.openclaw (root vs your non-root user). 6) Review the systemd unit: running the gateway as root and Restart=always gives persistent privileged execution — consider running as a dedicated, non-root user and confirm the openclaw binary path exists. 7) Test these steps in a staging VM first. If you want, I can produce a safer, annotated version of these commands (with backups, checks, non-root service example, and recommended permission fixes).Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
latestvk978waqhmdfjrxqqm7rmm7yhb181xfkg
License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.