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Security audit

Multi-Account Social Media Operator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed PostLake operating guide for high-volume social publishing, with proportionate guardrails and no hidden execution or exfiltration behavior in the reviewed artifact.

Install only if you intend to let PostLake manage public social posting at scale. Configure allowed profiles, allowed networks, daily caps, OAuth access, and revocation before use, and prefer pinned or reviewed package versions where your OpenClaw environment supports them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Plugin and Skill Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 22–23
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

The installation instructions use mutable package identifiers without specifying trusted versions or immutable integrity hashes:

sh
openclaw plugins install clawhub:postlake
openclaw skills install @postlake/postlake-publish

Technical Analysis

Both commands resolve and install third-party components at installation time. Neither dependency is constrained to an audited version or verified against a documented cryptographic digest. Consequently, the code installed by a future user can differ from the code that was available when this skill was reviewed.

If the registry, publisher account, package namespace, or dependency release process is compromised, an attacker could distribute a modified plugin or skill through the same legitimate-looking identifiers. This is a supply-chain weakness; the audited SKILL.md itself does not contain evidence that the referenced packages are currently malicious.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry, namespace, or release pipeline associated with one of the referenced dependencies.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the existing package identifier.
  3. A user or agent follows the documented installation commands.
  4. OpenClaw resolves the mutable identifier to the compromised release because no audited version or digest is specified.
  5. The malicious component executes when installed or invoked, subject to the permissions and capabilities granted to the OpenClaw process and component.

Impact Assessment

A compromised dependency could execute with the privileges available to the OpenClaw runtime. Depending on the host configuration and permissions granted to the installed component, this could expose local files, authentication material, connected social-media capabilities, ...[truncated 310 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin each plugin and skill to a specific, reviewed version supported by the package manager.
  • Where supported, lock dependencies to immutable content digests or verified checksums rather than tags or mutable package names alone.
  • Document the expected publisher identity and require signature or provenance verification before installation.
  • Maintain a lockfile or equivalent dependency manifest in the project so installations are reproducible.
  • Review dependency release notes and package contents before updating pinned versions.
  • Run installed components with least privilege, restricting filesystem, credential, network, profile, and social-account access to only what is necessary.
  • Use a trusted internal mirror or allowlist for approved plugin and skill artifacts in sensitive environments.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This skill enables bulk publishing across 15 to 400+ social accounts and can materially affect public-facing content and account health at scale, but the description does not present a clear upfront warning about that operational blast radius. In agent-driven environments, missing or understated high-impact capability warnings increase the chance of accidental misuse, cross-brand posting mistakes, or mass account actions without adequate operator review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

openclaw skills install @postlake/postlake-publish

text

MCP: `https://api.postlake.dev/mcp`

## Your role

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 170)May include surrounding context.

openclaw skills install @postlake/postlake-publish

text

MCP: `https://api.postlake.dev/mcp`

## Your role