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Security audit

Email

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed email-management wrapper around the Port Eden CLI, with expected but sensitive access to mailbox content and email-sending actions.

Install only if you trust Port Eden and are comfortable granting it access to the selected mailbox. Use the narrowest provider scopes, set a dedicated profile for each account, confirm every send/reply/forward/delete/modify action, and log out or revoke the token when finished on shared or sensitive machines.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:4
Finding

Mutable Third-Party CLI Installation Without Version Pinning

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 4 and 12
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"📧","requires":{"bins":["porteden"],"env":["PE_API_KEY"]},"primaryEnv":"PE_API_KEY","install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"porteden/tap/porteden","bins":["porteden"],"label":"Install porteden (brew)"},{"id":"go","kind":"go","module":"github.com/porteden/cli/cmd/porteden@latest","bins":["porteden"],"label":"Install porteden (go)"}]}}
markdown
If `porteden` is not installed: `brew install porteden/tap/porteden` (or `go install github.com/porteden/cli/cmd/porteden@latest`).

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs users or agents to install a third-party executable using the mutable Go version selector @latest. The Homebrew instruction also installs the version currently exposed by an external tap without identifying a reviewed release or artifact checksum.

Because the executable's source is not included in this project, its behavior could not be audited. A future upstream release can differ from the version that existed when this Skill was reviewed. Installing @latest therefore permits externally controlled code changes to enter the execution environment without any corresponding modification to the audited Skill.

This is particularly sensitive because the installed CLI is subsequently expected to process PE_API_KEY, interact with the system keyring, read private email content, and perform mailbox mutations. No evidence establishes that the current upstream package is malicious; the vulnerability is the absence of dependency immutability and artifact verification.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, release process, Go module source, or Homebrew tap used to distribute porteden.
  2. The attacker publishes a modified release that is selected by @latest or up ...[truncated 1227 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace @latest with a specifically reviewed semantic version or immutable commit identifier, for example:
    text
    go install github.com/porteden/cli/cmd/porteden@vX.Y.Z
  2. Pin the Homebrew installation to a reviewed formula and version where the distribution mechanism permits it.
  3. Document expected module checksums, release signatures, or artifact hashes and verify them before installation.
  4. Use reproducible builds and retain a software bill of materials for the reviewed CLI release.
  5. Configure automated dependency monitoring so version updates undergo review rather than being adopted implicitly.
  6. Restrict PE_API_KEY and provider authorization to the narrowest mailbox scopes required by the requested operation.
  7. Run the CLI in a constrained environment with minimal filesystem, environment-variable, and network access.
  8. Document the external network endpoints required by the CLI and deny unrelated outbound destinations where feasible.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
## Setup (once)

- **Browser login (recommended):** `porteden auth login` — opens browser, credentials stored in system keyring
- **Direct token:** `porteden auth login --token <key>` — stored in system keyring
- **Verify:** `porteden auth status`
- If `PE_API_KEY` is set in the environment, the CLI uses it automatically (no login needed).

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
## Setup (once)

- **Browser login (recommended):** `porteden auth login` — opens browser, credentials stored in system keyring
- **Direct token:** `porteden auth login --token <key>` — stored in system keyring
- **Verify:** `porteden auth status`
- If `PE_API_KEY` is set in the environment, the CLI uses it automatically (no login needed).

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
## Setup (once)

- **Browser login (recommended):** `porteden auth login` — opens browser, credentials stored in system keyring
- **Direct token:** `porteden auth login --token <key>` — stored in system keyring
- **Verify:** `porteden auth status`
- If `PE_API_KEY` is set in the environment, the CLI uses it automatically (no login needed).

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.