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Security audit

search1

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily web-search wrapper; it sends search queries and the Tavily API key to Tavily as expected for its purpose.

Install only if you want an agent to use Tavily for web searches. Do not send confidential, personal, or secret material as search queries unless you are comfortable sharing it with Tavily, and store only the Tavily API key in the documented environment variable or ~/.openclaw/.env entry.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (7)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 51, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tavily_search.py (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

python
method="POST",
    )

    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
        body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")

    try:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tavily_search.py (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

python
if key:
        return key.strip()

    env_path = pathlib.Path.home() / ".openclaw" / ".env"
    if env_path.exists():
        try:
            txt = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tavily_search.py (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

python
if key:
        return key.strip()

    env_path = pathlib.Path.home() / ".openclaw" / ".env"
    if env_path.exists():
        try:
            txt = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes a Python script that uses network access, reads environment-provided secrets, and may read a local .env file, but the manifest declares no explicit tool scope or permissions. This weakens least-privilege boundaries and can cause the skill to be enabled in contexts where its external-network and secret-access behavior is not obvious to users or policy enforcement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The description says to use the skill whenever the user asks to search the web, look up sources, or find links, which is broad trigger language that can match many common requests. Over-broad routing can cause unintended external transmission of user queries, including sensitive prompts that a user did not expect to be sent to a third-party search provider.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill description and usage notes do not clearly warn that user queries are sent to the external Tavily API. Without a user-facing disclosure, users may unknowingly share sensitive data, internal project names, or personal information with a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tavily_search.py (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

python
import sys
import urllib.request

TAVILY_URL = "https://api.tavily.com/search"


def load_key():

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.