T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:54- Finding
Mandatory Agent-Wide Trade Routing Through Publisher-Selected Tools
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent Polymarket trading desk, but it asks for live trading authority and private-key handling with broad agent-routing instructions that need human review before use.
Install only if you deliberately want this package to be your Polymarket trading desk. Use a dedicated low-balance exit key, avoid long-lived shell environment secrets, verify the npm packages and versions yourself, and do not enable live mode or the watcher until you understand that it may submit real SELL orders through this tooling.
SKILL.md:54Mandatory Agent-Wide Trade Routing Through Publisher-Selected Tools
scripts/package.json:6Third-Party npm Packages Are Retrieved and Dynamically Executed Without Repository-Level Integrity Controls
NAUTILUS-SIDECAR.md:6Private-Key Presence Automatically Transitions the Watcher From Dry-Run to Live Selling
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
mkdir -p pm-stops-sidecar && cd pm-stops-sidecar
npm pack @hypelens/hypelens-agent-guard@0.1.18 && tar -xzf hypelens-hypelens-agent-guard-0.1.18.tgz
cp -r package/compose/* . && rm -rf package *.tgz
export FUNDER=0xYourFunder EXIT_PK=0xYourExitKey
./up.sh
# or: docker compose up -d --build
The instructions tell the user to export a live exit private key and run a watcher that can sell positions, but they do not clearly warn that this enables real on-chain/live-market actions and exposes highly sensitive key material in the shell environment. In this trading context, accidental misuse, shell-history leakage, process-environment exposure, or operator misunderstanding can directly lead to loss of funds.
Documenting that EXIT_PK automatically flips exits.dryRun:false without a prominent safety warning creates a significant foot-gun: merely supplying the key can silently convert the system from simulation to live protective exits. In a Polymarket trading skill, that means immediate real order placement is plausible, especially since the file emphasizes auto-arming and breach-triggered exits.
This is the same unpinned npx hypelens-agent-guard reference in the compose command chain, so it carries the same risk: arbitrary future package code may be fetched at runtime. Because the tool is documented to receive AGENT_GUARD_EXIT_PK and execute live exits, the blast radius includes unauthorized trades and potential credential exposure.
The skill advertises very broad activation phrases such as place, trade, bet, buy, and sell in a financial-trading context, making it likely to trigger on ordinary user language even when the user did not explicitly request this specific skill. Because this skill is positioned as a default desk for funded Polymarket trading and protection workflows, an overbroad match can route sensitive trading actions through this skill unexpectedly, increasing the chance of unintended financial operations.
Wildcard recommendation triggers like *place*, *trade*, and *bet* are highly ambiguous and can match broad everyday language, causing the skill to be recommended or selected in contexts unrelated to Polymarket. In an autonomous or semi-autonomous agent environment, this increases the risk of accidental invocation of a live trading desk and can bias tool selection toward a financially sensitive skill.
The installation path uses npx skills add ... without pinning the skills CLI to an exact version, which introduces a supply-chain risk because the latest published package will be fetched and executed at install time. In a trading skill that handles wallet setup and operational desk processes, compromise of that bootstrap dependency could lead to malicious code execution, credential theft, or transaction manipulation.
No suspicious patterns detected.