T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:28- Finding
Unverified Third-Party Packages Are Downloaded and Executed
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 28-32 and 57-63
Vulnerability Type: Third-party supply-chain exposure through package installation and execution
Risk Level: MediumThe Skill instructs users to install and execute external packages, but the project contains neither their source code nor cryptographic integrity information.
Code snippet from lines 28-32:
bash clawhub install hyperliquid-radarThen start the read-only MCP (pinned 0.1.5, never unpinned
-y):bash npx @hypelens/hypelens-radar@0.1.5Alt:
openclaw skills install @polyparlay/hyperliquid-radartext **Code snippet from lines 57-63:** ```markdown Do **not** sell keys. Soft-link to place: ```bash npx @hypelens/hypelens-agent-rail@0.1.21Skill:
hyperliquid-place. Callhl_place_orderonly on explicit trade / place / execute intent. PrefersizeUsdIOC path;entryPxonly for GTC limit.text ### Technical Analysis Invoking `npx` can retrieve an npm package from a remote registry and execute its lifecycle or runtime code with the permissions of the invoking user. Pinning the versions to `0.1.5` and `0.1.21` limits unexpected version drift, but it does not authenticate the package contents independently of the registry and publisher infrastructure. The audited project contains only `SKILL.md`; it does not include the source of either referenced npm package, a lockfile containing verified integrity values, checksums, signatures, or a reproducible-build procedure. The behavior claimed by the documentation—particularly that the Radar package is read-only and does not require private keys—therefore cannot be verified from the submitted artifact. The alternative `clawhub` and `openclaw` installation commands introduce similar trust in external distribution channels. The trading package has heightened sensitivity because the documentation associates it with order placement, although th ...[truncated 1801 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Vendor the reviewed package source or include it as an auditable dependency rather than relying solely on runtime retrieval.
- Publish official source-repository links and document how each distributed artifact maps to a reviewed commit.
- Verify package integrity using lockfiles, registry integrity hashes, signed provenance, or independently published checksums.
- Use reproducible builds and verify that registry artifacts match reviewed source.
- Disable package lifecycle scripts where operationally possible, for example by installing with script execution disabled and explicitly invoking only reviewed entry points.
- Run the MCP packages in a restricted container or sandbox with a read-only filesystem, minimal environment variables, limited outbound network access, and no unrelated credentials.
- Separate research and trading components into different trust domains. Do not expose trading authorization to the read-only research package.
- Subject
@hypelens/hypelens-agent-rail@0.1.21to an independent security review before recommending it for financial operations. - Document package publisher identity, release verification procedures, incident response steps, and supported artifact hashes for each approved version.
