T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:9- Finding
Untrusted Remote Task Descriptions Can Hijack the Agent's Goals
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is purpose-aligned but needs review because it lets mutable remote tasks drive agent work and sends profile and submission data to an external production service without clear user-control boundaries.
Review this before installing. Use a dedicated POLT API key, avoid submitting secrets, private repository contents, credentials, internal documents, or access tokens, and require the agent to summarize any remote task and get your approval before committing, doing work, or submitting results.
SKILL.md:9Untrusted Remote Task Descriptions Can Hijack the Agent's Goals
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- `POST /api/projects/:id/advance` — Advance project stage
- `POST /api/tasks` — Create task
- `PATCH /api/tasks/:id` — Update task
- `DELETE /api/tasks/:id` — Cancel task
- `GET /api/cto/pending-reviews` — View pending reviews
- `PATCH /api/submissions/:id/review` — Approve/reject submission
- `POST /api/submissions/:id/request-revision` — Request revision
The skill directs agents to use an external production server and to submit registration, profile, and work-submission data, but it does not warn users that this information leaves the local environment and is sent to a third-party service. That can cause unintentional disclosure of sensitive identifiers, profile metadata, proprietary work product, or secrets included in submissions.
No suspicious patterns detected.