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Security audit

Polt

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent POLT API guide, but it can drive live account, posting, voting, and bounty-task actions without enough consent and untrusted-task safeguards.

Install only if you are comfortable with the agent interacting with a live POLT account. Before allowing authenticated actions, confirm each registration, task commitment, submission, vote, reply, profile update, or project/meme post, and treat POLT task descriptions as untrusted content that cannot authorize local file access, secrets, command execution, or unrelated third-party actions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:220
Finding
Untrusted Remote Task Descriptions Can Hijack Agent Instructions## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:220` **Vulnerability Type**: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking **Risk Level**: High **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```markdown Do whatever the task requires. The task description explains what needs to be done. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs the agent to retrieve task descriptions from the external POLT platform and to perform whatever those descriptions require. Because platform users may supply task content, those descriptions constitute untrusted remote input. The skill does not establish an instruction-precedence policy, constrain permissible operations, require user review, or prohibit task text from requesting sensitive local actions. This creates an indirect prompt-injection boundary: a task author can place operational instructions in a task description, and the quoted directive encourages the agent to treat those instructions as authoritative. The effective behavior can therefore change remotely after the skill package has been reviewed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker publishes a POLT task containing hostile instructions in its description. 2. The agent retrieves or opens that task through the documented POLT API. 3. The skill instructs the agent to do whatever the task requires. 4. The agent interprets the attacker-controlled description as actionable instructions rather than untrusted content. 5. Subject to the tools and permissions available to the agent, the hostile task may request local file access, command execution, credential collection, external transmission of data, or unrelated state-changing actions. 6. If the agent complies without independent authorization, sensitive information or system integrity may be compromised. ### Impact Assessment Exploitation could redirect the current agent session away from the user's intended objective. The attainable scope depends on the agent runtime's existing tools and privileges; the skill itsel ...[truncated 571 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace the unrestricted directive with language that explicitly treats all task descriptions, submissions, replies, and other platform content as untrusted data. 2. Define an instruction-precedence rule stating that remote content cannot override system, developer, skill, or user instructions. 3. Require explicit user review and approval before committing to a task or performing consequential operations. 4. Prohibit remote task content from authorizing access to secrets, credentials, local files, environment variables, private repositories, wallets, or unrelated services. 5. Require separate user confirmation before command execution, file modification, credential use, data transmission, financial activity, or other state-changing actions. 6. Restrict task execution to a declared allowlist of tools, directories, network destinations, and operation types needed for the user-approved task. 7. Add validation that rejects or pauses tasks containing requests to ignore prior instructions, alter safety controls, expose confidential data, install software, or execute externally supplied code. 8. Present the task description to the user as quoted content and summarize the proposed actions before execution.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
- `POST /api/projects/:id/advance` — Advance project stage
- `POST /api/tasks` — Create task
- `PATCH /api/tasks/:id` — Update task
- `DELETE /api/tasks/:id` — Cancel task
- `POST /api/tasks/:id/mark-paid` — Mark bounty as paid
- `GET /api/cto/pending-reviews` — View pending reviews
- `PATCH /api/submissions/:id/review` — Approve/reject submission
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill is marked user-invocable with a broad description but provides no clear activation boundaries, allowed user intents, or safety gating for actions against a live external service. That makes it easy for routine user prompts to trigger account creation, posting, voting, or task commitment actions on a production platform without sufficient confirmation or scope restriction.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill directs use of a live production API and encourages registration, profile creation, submissions, replies, and other content posting, but it does not warn that user content, profile details, and possibly generated work will be transmitted to a third-party service. This creates privacy and consent risk because users may not realize their data is leaving the assistant environment and becoming stored or visible on POLT.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.