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Security audit

spraay-gateway

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed Spraay payment-gateway helper with high-impact payment capabilities, but the artifacts require user confirmation and show no hidden persistence or secret harvesting.

Install only if you intend to use Spraay's external payment service. Treat SPRAAY_API_KEY as sensitive, verify recipient addresses and amounts yourself, and require a fresh explicit confirmation before any payout, escrow, payroll, x402 spend, or subscription action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

YARA rule 'ransomware_behavior': Ransomware-like patterns (mass encryption, ransom notes) [malware]

Critical
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md
wallet instead.
      - name: SPRAAY_WALLET_ADDRESS
        required: false
        description: >-
          Optional. The user's own public address, used only for read-only
          lookups via GET /api/v1/balances.
    emoji: "💧"
    homepage: https://gateway.spraay.app
---

# Spraay Gateway

Spraay is a multi-chain x402 payment gateway. Its core capability is **batch payments**: pay up to 200 recipients in a single transaction with roughly 80% gas savings versus individual transfers. Around that core it exposes 190 endpoints (32 free, 150+ paid) across 37 categories on 15 mainnet chains (Base, Solana, Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, XRP Ledger, Stellar, Bitcoin, Stacks, and more) — escrow, crypto payroll, robot task payments (RTP), GPU/compute, token data, and research.

Provenance: the Spraay payment toolset (batch, escrow, RTP) is merged into NVIDIA's NeMo-Agent-Toolkit-Examples (#27), ships as a community integration on the official Strands Agents documentation site

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
xplicit user confirmation before any fund-moving call. The only bundled script, scripts/check-access.sh, checks gateway reachability and whether SPRAAY_API_KEY

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

md
xplicit user confirmation before any fund-moving call. The only bundled script, scripts/check-access.sh, checks gateway reachability and whether SPRAAY_API_KEY

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md
xplicit user confirmation before any fund-moving call. The only bundled script, scripts/check-access.sh, checks gateway reachability and whether SPRAAY_API_KEY

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

md
xplicit user confirmation before any fund-moving call. The only bundled script, scripts/check-access.sh, checks gateway reachability and whether SPRAAY_API_KEY

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill performs security-relevant actions via shell and outbound network access, but it does not declare an enforceable tool scope such as explicit permissions or allowed-tools in the manifest. That mismatch can cause the runtime or reviewer to underestimate the skill's effective capabilities, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or network use beyond what policy expects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

md
## Human approval rules (non-negotiable)

- **Never initiate any payment, subscription, or checkout autonomously.** Subscribing is a human-in-browser action. x402 per-call payments require the user's explicit "yes" for each spend, with the amount stated.
- **Any endpoint that moves funds** (`/api/v1/batch/execute`, `/api/v1/escrow/create`, payroll runs, robot task dispatch) requires: (a) a prior dry run via `POST /free/validate-batch` and `GET /free/estimate-batch`, (b) a plain-language preview shown to the user — recipient count, total amount, token, chain, estimated fees — and (c) the user's explicit confirmation of that exact preview. No confirmation, no execution.
- Never request, read, or handle private keys or seed phrases. Signing happens in the user's own wallet tooling.

## Endpoint reference

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/endpoints.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

Validate a batch payout (dry run — always do this before executing)

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://gateway.spraay.app/free/validate-batch" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "chain": "base",

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.