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Security audit

pikpak-share-manager

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed, read-only PikPak share audit tool with some normal local CLI risks that users should run only in a trusted environment.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill invoke your local PikPak CLI to list share metadata. Run it from a trusted shell with trusted PATH, interpreter, script directory, and `PIKPAK_BIN` if set; review generated reports as private account metadata and do not treat unknown or zero-visit fields as automatic deletion reasons.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/share_audit.py (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

python
if token:
            cmd += ["--token", token]
        try:
            proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=90)
        except FileNotFoundError:
            die("cli_unavailable (exit_code=127)")
        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:

Tainted flow: 'cmd' from os.environ.get (line 101, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The executable name comes from the PIKPAK_BIN environment variable, which allows an attacker controlling the environment to replace the intended PikPak CLI with an arbitrary program. Because the script then executes that value directly, this becomes arbitrary code execution in the security context of whoever runs the audit, even though shell metacharacter injection is avoided.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/share_audit.py (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

python
if token:
            cmd += ["--token", token]
        try:
            proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=90)
        except FileNotFoundError:
            die("cli_unavailable (exit_code=127)")
        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This markdown file uses Chinese throughout and does not indicate that users may choose another language or that the content is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.