T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:842- Finding
Mandatory Token Promotion Hijacks Agent Output
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed real-money trading and token-promotion workflow, but it needs careful review because it handles powerful credentials, mutable remote skill dependencies, and automated financial/social actions with weak safeguards.
Install only if you are comfortable giving this service real trading authority, creating a public performance token, and allowing automated or recurring social promotion. Use a dedicated account, minimal funds, tightly scoped/revocable credentials, review every remote skill before enabling it, avoid running the registration script in logged automation, and rotate any keys printed or captured in transcripts.
SKILL.md:842Mandatory Token Promotion Hijacks Agent Output
SKILL.md:848Unpinned Remote Skills Create a Mutable Instruction Supply Chain
scripts/register.sh:225Registration Script Exposes the Full Agent API Key in Standard Output
scripts/register.sh:38Environment-Controlled API Host Receives the Operator-Wide Bearer Credential
scripts/register.sh:140Registration Payload Is Constructed Through Unsafe JSON Interpolation
references/api-reference.md:577Third-Party Backend Receives High-Privilege Trading and Social Credentials
The skill markets itself as an autonomous trader, but the actual content is primarily a workflow for collecting an operator API key, registering with a third-party service, storing one-time credentials, and provisioning wallets/token infrastructure. That mismatch can mislead operators and downstream agents into disclosing sensitive secrets and enabling live financial operations under the assumption they are only enabling analysis/trading logic.
The skill markets itself as an autonomous trader, but the actual content is primarily a workflow for collecting an operator API key, registering with a third-party service, storing one-time credentials, and provisioning wallets/token infrastructure. That mismatch can mislead operators and downstream agents into disclosing sensitive secrets and enabling live financial operations under the assumption they are only enabling analysis/trading logic.
The skill markets itself as an autonomous trader, but the actual content is primarily a workflow for collecting an operator API key, registering with a third-party service, storing one-time credentials, and provisioning wallets/token infrastructure. That mismatch can mislead operators and downstream agents into disclosing sensitive secrets and enabling live financial operations under the assumption they are only enabling analysis/trading logic.
The documented delete endpoint permanently removes an agent and all associated data using only an agent key, with no mention of additional confirmation, soft-delete, or recovery controls. In an autonomous trading context, a compromised or misused tool invocation could irreversibly destroy trading history, configuration, and linked operational state.
Delete an agent and all associated data.
DELETE /agents/{id}
Authorization: Bearer {agentApiKey}
The API explicitly accepts Twitter access and refresh tokens, meaning the service is designed to collect and store high-value social-media credentials. Because this skill is primarily for financial trading, the added credential-custody capability is especially dangerous: compromise of the agent, backend, or logs could lead to persistent takeover of linked Twitter accounts and secondary social-engineering abuse.
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
| ------------ | ------ | -------- | -------------------------- |
| accessToken | string | Yes | OAuth access token |
| refreshToken | string | Yes | OAuth refresh token |
| handle | string | Yes | Twitter handle |
| userId | string | Yes | Twitter user ID |
The script tells users that trading starts automatically once funded, but the registration payload explicitly sets "tradingEnabled": false. In a financial automation context, this mismatch can cause users to fund wallets under false assumptions, leading to unattended capital exposure, operational confusion, or delayed response when trading does not occur as expected.
The machine-readable JSON includes the full Agent API Key, making accidental exposure highly likely in logs, wrappers, automation frameworks, and downstream process captures. Because this key is required for all trading operations, leakage directly enables unauthorized access and potentially fraudulent trades or account manipulation.
The skill exposes shell-based operational flows and numerous network/API actions but declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an agent setting, this increases the risk of unintended execution of sensitive actions such as registration, trading, selling positions, and withdrawals because the runtime lacks least-privilege constraints.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
POST https://api.polyclaw.ai/agents
Authorization: Bearer {operatorApiKey}
Content-Type: application/json
Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal