Security audit

Huawei Cloud Swr Image Management

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Huawei Cloud SWR management guide; it handles sensitive cloud operations, but they are disclosed and mostly guarded with cautions and credential-handling notes.

Install only if you intend to manage Huawei Cloud SWR. Use least-privilege Huawei Cloud credentials, prefer temporary tokens unless long-term CI/CD credentials are necessary, store secrets only in a secret manager, and require explicit confirmation before deleting namespaces, repositories, or tags.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The trigger list contains broad terms such as 'container image', 'docker login', and generic Chinese equivalents that can match many unrelated user requests. This can cause the wrong skill to activate and perform or suggest sensitive SWR operations, including credential retrieval and destructive repository actions, in contexts where the user did not specifically intend Huawei Cloud SWR management.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The guide explicitly documents creation of a 1-year SWR login secret and recommends it for CI/CD automation, but does not warn about the persistence, storage, rotation, revocation, or leakage risks of long-lived registry credentials. In a skill that helps users manage container registries, this omission can normalize insecure credential handling and increase the chance that users generate durable secrets when shorter-lived tokens or platform-managed identities would be safer.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The workflow includes a destructive namespace deletion command immediately after suggesting cleanup, but does not require an explicit confirmation or a strong warning at the execution step. In an operational skill for container registry management, this can lead an agent or user to remove a namespace and all contained repositories unintentionally, causing service disruption and data loss.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The tag cleanup workflow instructs deletion of old tags without clearly warning that the action is irreversible and may break deployments, rollbacks, or automation that still references those tags. In an image lifecycle management skill, this raises the chance of accidental operational damage because tag deletion is presented as routine cleanup.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: The cleanup scenario includes a concrete destructive command (`DeleteRepoTag`) in an example workflow without reiterating the confirmation requirement that appears earlier in the document. In an agent-skill context, users or downstream automation may follow scenario steps directly, increasing the chance of accidental irreversible deletion of image tags without an explicit safety pause.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: The verification guide instructs operators to run `hcloud SWR CreateSecret` to retrieve long-term registry credentials, but it provides no warning about sensitive output handling, storage, redaction, or avoiding logs/terminal capture. In an agent or shared-terminal context, this increases the chance that durable credentials are exposed in transcripts, shell history, CI logs, or copied into insecure locations, enabling unauthorized access to the container registry.

VirusTotal

60/60 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.