T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/huawei_cloud/dispatcher.py:1469- Finding
Read-Only Skill Exposes Reachable Destructive Cloud Administration Actions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill says it is read-only cluster inspection, but its packaged dispatcher exposes powerful cloud and Kubernetes administration actions.
Review this before installing as an admin-capable Huawei Cloud tool, not a read-only inspection skill. Use a tightly scoped read-only IAM/RBAC identity, do not pass AK/SK on command lines, avoid Secret/kubeconfig actions, and prefer a package that separates inspection from remediation or enforces a read-only action allowlist.
scripts/huawei_cloud/dispatcher.py:1469Read-Only Skill Exposes Reachable Destructive Cloud Administration Actions
scripts/huawei_cloud/cce.py:3313Dispatcher Can Return Kubernetes Secret Payloads Across All Namespaces
scripts/huawei_cloud/cce.py:3369Temporary Kubernetes Private Keys Use Predictable Paths While TLS Verification Is Disabled
scripts/huawei_cloud/chart_generator.py:343Generated HTML Reports Execute Third-Party CDN JavaScript Without Integrity Verification
This file contains multiple remote state-changing operations such as creating, updating, enabling, disabling, and deleting AOM alarm and action rules, even though the skill is described as a read-only daily cluster inspection tool. The confirm=true guard reduces accidental execution, but it does not remove the dangerous capability mismatch: any caller that can invoke the skill can still mutate monitoring configuration and suppress or alter alerting.
The skill is described as a read-only, low-risk daily inspection tool, but this file exposes numerous mutation and destructive operations including deleting clusters/nodes/workloads, scaling workloads, draining nodes, hibernating clusters, and binding/unbinding control-plane EIPs. This is dangerous because an agent or user selecting the skill based on its manifest could be socially engineered into invoking powerful write operations that cause outage, data loss, or public exposure.
The skill manifest says this skill is for daily inspection and explicitly read-only, but the module exposes destructive and state-changing operations including cluster deletion, hibernation/awakening, EIP binding/unbinding, and cluster creation. This violates the declared trust boundary of the skill and could let a user or downstream agent invoke powerful infrastructure mutations under the guise of a low-risk inspection tool.
This file materially violates the declared skill boundary of 'read-only' daily inspection by exposing destructive node-management operations including delete, cordon, uncordon, drain, and create. In an agent setting, this capability mismatch is dangerous because a caller expecting a safe inspection skill could be induced to perform production-impacting actions, leading to outage, workload eviction, or unauthorized infrastructure changes.
The dispatcher registers a very large set of state-changing actions including cluster/node deletion, workload scaling, hibernation, addon install/uninstall, alarm-rule mutation, remediation, reboot/start/stop, and infrastructure binding operations. That directly contradicts the skill’s stated purpose of low-risk, read-only daily inspection, so a caller expecting safe inspection could instead invoke destructive or privilege-expanding operations through the same skill surface.
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
---
name: daily-cluster-inspector
description: Use this skill for daily Huawei Cloud CCE health checks, quick checks, cluster inspections, heartbeat summaries, and continuous operations reports.
---
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
The skill is presented as a low-risk, read-only inspection tool, yet the analyzed behavior indicates access to destructive and mutating operations across CCE, Kubernetes, alarms, addons, node pools, workloads, and surrounding cloud infrastructure. This mismatch is dangerous because operators and higher-level agents may grant trust or invoke the skill under the assumption that it cannot change state, when in fact it may delete resources, scale workloads, expose control planes, or return access material.
Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal, suspicious.insecure_tls_verification