T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/huawei_cloud/dispatcher.py:1447- Finding
Read-only Skill exposes undeclared destructive cloud operations
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill presents itself as read-only analysis, but its shipped dispatcher exposes many cloud and Kubernetes mutation actions that could alter or delete production resources.
Treat this as needing manual review before installation. Only use it with tightly scoped read-only Huawei Cloud credentials and Kubernetes RBAC, and do not install it in an environment where the skill can invoke its bundled dispatcher with write-capable credentials unless the package is split or allowlisted to the documented read-only actions.
scripts/huawei_cloud/dispatcher.py:1447Read-only Skill exposes undeclared destructive cloud operations
scripts/huawei_cloud/cce.py:1119Kubernetes API server certificate verification is disabled
scripts/huawei_cloud/network.py:670Signed Huawei Cloud API request disables TLS verification
scripts/huawei_cloud/cce.py:1160Kubernetes client private keys are written through unsafe temporary paths
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Inspecting current node security-group configuration for a single node is much narrower than the promised comprehensive, historical, multi-source change-impact report. The danger is not direct exploitation so much as false confidence and unnecessary exposure of IAM/ECS/VPC access under a misleading product description.
Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal, suspicious.insecure_tls_verification