Huawei Cloud Cce Auto Remediation Runner

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 9:35 AM UTC
• Version: 0.1.3

Overview

This Huawei Cloud remediation skill has a legitimate purpose, but it bundles broad extra cloud-management and secret-access actions that are not clearly disclosed or safely scoped.

Review this skill before installing. Only use it with narrowly scoped, temporary Huawei Cloud credentials, and do not grant permissions for Kubernetes Secrets or undeclared provisioning actions unless you intentionally need them. The package should be reduced to a skill-specific action allowlist and should fix confirmation enforcement, TLS verification, and temporary credential-file handling.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (5)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/dispatcher.py:1231

Finding

Undeclared CCE cluster creation bypasses the mandatory preview and confirmation workflow

Content

View full analysis

Dict[str, Any]: return cce_cluster.create_cce_cluster( region=params["region"], cluster_name=params["cluster_name"], vpc_id=params["vpc_id"], subnet_id=params["subnet_id"], cluster_version=params.get("cluster_version"), cluster_type=params.get("cluster_type", "VirtualMachine"), container_network_type=params.get("container_network_type", "overlay_l2"), container_network_cidr=params.get("container_network_cidr"), service_network_cidr=params.get("service_network_cidr"), flavor_id=params.get("flavor_id"), description=params.get("description"), ak=params.get("ak"), sk=params.get("sk"), project_id=params.get("project_id"), ) ``` The action is exposed through the generic dispatcher: ```python "huawei_create_cce_cluster": ( ("region", "cluster_name", "vpc_id", "subnet_id"), _create_cce_cluster ), ``` The implementation performs the cloud mutation immediately: ```python request = CreateClusterRequest(body=cluster_body) response = client.create_cluster(request) return { "success": True, "region": region, "action": "create_cce_cluster", "cluster_id": cluster_id, "cluster_name": cluster_name_result, "message": "Cluster creation request submitted successfully", " ...[truncated 2390 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/cce.py:3313

Finding

Dispatcher permits all-namespace Kubernetes Secret export, including Secret payloads

Content

View full analysis

Dict[str, Any]: return cce.list_cce_secrets( params["region"], params["cluster_id"], params.get("namespace"), _to_int(params.get("limit"), 100), params.get("include_data", "false").lower() == "true", params.get("ak"), params.get("sk"), params.get("project_id") ) ``` It is registered as a callable action: ```python "huawei_list_cce_secrets": ( ("region", "cluster_id"), _list_cce_secrets ), ``` The implementation defaults to querying every namespace when no namespace is supplied and allows the caller to request Secret data: ```python core_v1 = k8s_client.CoreV1Api() if namespace: secrets = core_v1.list_namespaced_secret(namespace, limit=limit) else: secrets = core_v1.list_secret_for_all_namespaces(limit=limit) secret_list = [] for secret in secrets.items: secret_info = { "name": secret.metadata.name, "namespace": secret.metadata.namespace, "type": secret.type, "created": str(secret.metadata.creation_timestamp) if secret.metadata.creation_timestamp else None, "labels": secret.metadata.labels, "annotations": secret.metadata.annotations, "data_keys": list(secret.data.keys()) if secret.data else [] } if include_data and secret.data: secret_info["data"] = secret.data secret_list.append(secret_info) ``` Kubernetes Secret values are returned in base64 form. Base64 is transport encoding rather than encryption, so any caller receiving the res ...[truncated 2013 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/cce.py:3369

Finding

TLS certificate validation is disabled for authenticated Kubernetes API operations

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/cce.py:3382

Finding

CCE client private keys are written to predictable shared temporary paths with unsafe cleanup

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/network.py:681

Finding

Signed NAT API requests disable HTTPS certificate verification

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

`; never disable validation. 4. Validate `region` against an explicit supported-region allowlist before constructing endpoints. 5. Do not return complete request URLs or authorization-related diagnostics in responses. 6. Reject redirects for signed requests unless the target host is independently validated. 7. Add integration tests proving that self-signed, expired, and host-mismatched certificates are rejected. 8. Review the analogous `verify=False` request in `scripts/huawei_cloud/storage.py` and apply the same correction. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (429)

Hidden Instructions

High

• Category: Prompt Injection
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL-CN.md (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

md

---
name: auto-remediation-runner
description: Use this skill only when the user asks for a Huawei Cloud CCE remediation action or a diagnosis result needs a preview-first recovery plan, including Deployment rollback, restart/scale/resize, cordon/drain, reboot, isolation, traffic cutover, vulnerability status change, or cluster hibernate and awake.
---

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

Reading IAM credentials, requesting IAM tokens, querying ECS by IP, and inspecting security groups are broader account- and network-security capabilities than the declared remediation role suggests. These functions can be abused for reconnaissance and privilege use outside the target cluster, especially given the skill's access to production cloud credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal, suspicious.insecure_tls_verification

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

• Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/cce_nodepool.py:456

HTTPS certificate verification is disabled.

Warn

• Code: suspicious.insecure_tls_verification
• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/network.py:781

HTTPS certificate verification is disabled.

Warn

• Code: suspicious.insecure_tls_verification
• Location: scripts/huawei_cloud/storage.py:416