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Security audit

chatterbox-tts-recovery

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent recovery guidance, but it tells agents to run a mutable external installer that creates enabled user services without pinning or verifying the source revision.

Install only if you trust the Chatterbox add-on source and are comfortable with user-level services being installed and enabled. Before running the installer, use an exact trusted repository URL and a reviewed commit or signed release, inspect the installer, back up voices and systemd drop-ins, and keep services bound to loopback unless you intentionally harden authentication.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:114
Finding

Execution of an Unpinned External Installer

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 114-151
Vulnerability Type: Untrusted and mutable upstream dependency execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

markdown
Use a clean/current checkout of `pinguy/chatterbox-tts-addon`.

Before installing from it:

```bash
make validate

Do not deploy a checkout that fails its own validation.

The validation covers Python syntax, manifests, installer/build shell syntax, Firefox/Chrome JavaScript syntax, and browser package construction.

...

For a full backend reinstall:

bash
bash chatterbox-tts-addon/install.sh

The installer uses a private environment under ~/.local/share/chatterbox-tts/, installs the canonical backend files and user units, and enables the bridge and Voice Lab.

text

### Technical Analysis

The recovery instructions direct the agent to use a “clean/current checkout” of the external `pinguy/chatterbox-tts-addon` repository and execute its `install.sh` script. They do not require a pinned commit hash, signed release, verified repository URL, checksum, or manual review of upstream changes.

A mutable current checkout can change after this skill has been audited. Running `make validate` does not establish the provenance or safety of the checkout: the documented validation only checks syntax, manifests, package construction, and related functional properties. An attacker-controlled installer can satisfy these checks while still executing malicious commands.

The installer runs with the invoking user's privileges and is expected to install executable backend files, create user systemd units, and enable services. Consequently, compromise of the upstream repository, maintainer account, selected branch, download path, or preexisting local checkout can turn the documented recovery process into an arbitrary code-execution channel.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, maintainer acco
...[truncated 1455 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the instruction to use a “current” checkout with an audited, immutable commit hash or release tag.
  2. Specify the exact trusted HTTPS repository URL to prevent similarly named or locally substituted repositories from being used.
  3. Require verification of a signed commit or signed release against a documented maintainer key.
  4. Publish and verify cryptographic checksums for release artifacts before any script is executed.
  5. Review the installer and all scripts or build targets it invokes whenever the pinned revision changes.
  6. Run validation only after provenance verification; do not treat syntax or package validation as a security check.
  7. Show and confirm the proposed filesystem and systemd changes before enabling services.
  8. Execute installation with the least privileges required and avoid privilege elevation.
  9. Record the verified revision in recovery logs so the installed source can be traced and reproduced.
  10. Consider distributing reviewed release artifacts rather than executing an installer directly from a mutable source checkout.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep