ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

聘才猫（Pincaimao）职业规划助手 v2

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a resume-based career advice skill that sends the user-selected resume and related inputs to a disclosed third-party API, which is sensitive but aligned with its purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable sending resume contents to api.pincaimao.com. Redact unnecessary personal details first, use a dedicated API key, and verify the resume path before invoking the skill.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
COS_KEY=$(echo "$UPLOAD" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['cos_key'])")

# Step 2: 生成职业建议
curl -s -X POST 'https://api.pincaimao.com/agents/v1/chat/chat-messages' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $PCM_CAREER_PLANNING_KEY" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
This second external transmission finding at the chat endpoint is also valid: it sends analysis inputs tied to the uploaded resume to a third-party API. Even though the destination is documented and expected for the skill, it still represents a real confidentiality boundary crossing.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
ADVICE_TYPE="晋升路径"  # 初入职场 | 转型建议 | 晋升路径

# Step 1: 上传简历
UPLOAD=$(curl -s -X POST 'https://api.pincaimao.com/agents/v1/files/upload' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $PCM_CAREER_PLANNING_KEY" \
  -F "file=@$RESUME_FILE")
COS_KEY=$(echo "$UPLOAD" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['cos_key'])")
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill uploads a local resume file to an external service, which is a genuine external data transmission of sensitive user content. In this context, the danger is elevated because resumes often include PII, work history, contact details, and other confidential career information.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
COS_KEY=$(echo "$UPLOAD" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['cos_key'])")

# Step 2: 生成职业建议
curl -s -X POST 'https://api.pincaimao.com/agents/v1/chat/chat-messages' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $PCM_CAREER_PLANNING_KEY" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
This second external transmission finding at the chat endpoint is also valid: it sends analysis inputs tied to the uploaded resume to a third-party API. Even though the destination is documented and expected for the skill, it still represents a real confidentiality boundary crossing.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.