Phy Xss Audit

Security

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) static vulnerability scanner (OWASP A03:2021). Detects reflected, stored, and DOM-based XSS in JavaScript/TypeScript, React, Vue, Angular, Python/Django/Jinja2, PHP, Ruby/ERB, and Go html/template. Zero external dependencies — pure Python stdlib only.

Install

openclaw skills install phy-xss-audit

phy-xss-audit — XSS Vulnerability Static Scanner

Scans source code for Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities across 10 checks covering server-side rendering, client-side DOM manipulation, and framework-specific patterns. Maps to OWASP A03:2021 — Injection and CWE-79.

Quick Start

# Scan entire project
python3 ~/.claude/skills/phy-xss-audit/scripts/xss_audit.py .

# Scan single file
python3 ~/.claude/skills/phy-xss-audit/scripts/xss_audit.py src/components/Post.tsx

# CI mode — exits 1 on any CRITICAL or HIGH finding
python3 ~/.claude/skills/phy-xss-audit/scripts/xss_audit.py . --ci

# JSON output (for SARIF pipelines)
python3 ~/.claude/skills/phy-xss-audit/scripts/xss_audit.py . --format json

# GitHub Actions annotations
python3 ~/.claude/skills/phy-xss-audit/scripts/xss_audit.py . --format github

# Run only one check
python3 ~/.claude/skills/phy-xss-audit/scripts/xss_audit.py . --check XV003

The 10 Checks

ID	Severity	Title	CWE	Languages
XV001	HIGH	innerHTML / outerHTML with user data	CWE-79	JS/TS/Vue/HTML
XV002	HIGH	document.write() with user data	CWE-79	JS/TS/HTML
XV003	CRITICAL	eval() / setTimeout(string) with user data	CWE-95	JS/TS/Vue
XV004	HIGH	dangerouslySetInnerHTML without DOMPurify	CWE-79	React JSX/TSX
XV005	CRITICAL	Django mark_safe() / autoescape off	CWE-79	Python/HTML
XV006	CRITICAL	Jinja2 \| safe filter or Markup() bypass	CWE-79	Python/HTML
XV007	HIGH	PHP echo/print without htmlspecialchars	CWE-79	PHP
XV008	HIGH	ERB raw / html_safe without sanitize	CWE-79	Ruby/ERB
XV009	HIGH	Vue v-html with dynamic expression	CWE-79	Vue
XV010	HIGH	Angular bypassSecurityTrust / Go template.HTML cast	CWE-79	TS/Go

Pass / Partial / Fail Criteria

XV001 — innerHTML / outerHTML with user data

FAIL (HIGH): element.innerHTML = or .html() (jQuery) where user-controlled data (req.query, req.body, request.GET, location.search, etc.) flows in within ±20 lines, and no DOMPurify.sanitize() guard nearby.
PASS: Sanitized with DOMPurify.sanitize(input) before assignment, or data source is internal/static only.

XV002 — document.write() with user data

FAIL (HIGH): document.write() or document.writeln() with user-controlled data in nearby lines.
PASS: document.write() only writes developer-controlled static strings (no user input path).

XV003 — eval() / setTimeout(string) with user data

FAIL (CRITICAL): eval(userVar), setTimeout(userVar + "..."), or new Function(...) with user data in the argument. Skipped in test/spec files.
PASS: eval() used only with static strings (JSON schemas, etc.), or user data passed via safe JSON.parse().

XV004 — dangerouslySetInnerHTML without DOMPurify

FAIL (HIGH): React component uses dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: ... }} without DOMPurify.sanitize() wrapping the value within 5 lines.
PASS: Value is DOMPurify.sanitize(html) — pattern DOMPurify.sanitize( appears within ±5 lines.

XV005 — Django mark_safe() / autoescape off

FAIL (CRITICAL): mark_safe(user_data) where user-controlled data flows in ±10 lines. Also fires on {% autoescape off %} in any template.
PASS: mark_safe() only wraps developer-defined static HTML strings, or data is sanitized with bleach.clean() first.

XV006 — Jinja2 | safe filter or Markup() bypass

FAIL (CRITICAL): Template variable piped through | safe or wrapped in Markup() when user-controlled data is nearby within ±10 lines.
PASS: | safe used only on developer-controlled content (e.g., static site generator output with no user input).

XV007 — PHP echo/print without htmlspecialchars

FAIL (HIGH): echo $_GET['key'] or echo $var without htmlspecialchars() / htmlentities() / strip_tags() / filter_input() on the same line.
PASS: All user input wrapped with htmlspecialchars($var, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') before output.

XV008 — ERB raw / html_safe without sanitize

FAIL (HIGH): <%== user_var %>, user_var.html_safe, or raw user_var in ERB templates where user input flows in ±10 lines, with no sanitize() or strip_tags() guard nearby.
PASS: Output uses h(var) / escape_html(), or sanitize() wraps the user value.

XV009 — Vue v-html with dynamic expression

FAIL (HIGH): v-html="someVar" where the value is dynamic and no DOMPurify.sanitize() appears in the surrounding 10 lines.
PASS: Value is computed through DOMPurify.sanitize(rawHtml) before being bound to v-html.

XV010 — Angular bypassSecurityTrust / Go template.HTML cast

FAIL (HIGH): Angular bypassSecurityTrustHtml(userVar) or bypassSecurityTrustScript(userVar) where user data flows nearby. Go: template.HTML(userStr) or template.JS(userStr) cast with user-controlled input.
PASS: Angular — no bypass called; use standard [innerHTML] binding. Go — let html/template handle escaping automatically (never cast user strings to template.HTML).

XSS Types Covered

XSS Type	Checks
Reflected XSS	XV001, XV002, XV005, XV006, XV007
Stored XSS	XV001, XV004, XV008, XV009
DOM-based XSS	XV001, XV002, XV003
Server-Side Template Injection → XSS	XV005, XV006
Framework bypass XSS	XV004, XV009, XV010

Supported Languages and Frameworks

Language	Framework	Checks
JavaScript / TypeScript	Vanilla, React, Vue, Angular	XV001–XV004, XV009, XV010
Python	Django, Jinja2 (Flask/FastAPI)	XV005, XV006
PHP	Vanilla, WordPress	XV007
Ruby	Rails, Sinatra	XV008
Go	html/template, Gin	XV010

Taint Source Patterns (User-Controlled Data)

The scanner considers a value "user-controlled" if the surrounding ±15-20 lines contain:

req.query / req.body / req.params / req.headers       (Node.js/Express)
request.GET / request.POST / request.args / request.json  (Django/Flask)
params[ / query_params[ / @query_params               (Rails/FastAPI)
$_GET[ / $_POST[ / $_REQUEST[ / $_COOKIE[             (PHP)
location.search / location.hash / URLSearchParams(    (Browser DOM)
c.Query( / c.Param( / r.URL.Query(                    (Go Gin/stdlib)

Sanitization Guards (Auto-Suppression)

These patterns near a sink suppress the finding:

Guard	Context
`DOMPurify.sanitize(`	DOM XSS in JS/TS/Vue
`sanitize_html(`	Python bleach-based
`bleach.clean(`	Python Django
`htmlspecialchars(`	PHP
`htmlentities(`	PHP
`h(` / `html_escape(`	Rails ERB
`sanitize(`	Rails, Vue
`xss.filterXSS(`	Node.js xss library
`escape(`	Various
`strip_tags(`	PHP / Rails

CI Integration

# GitHub Actions
- name: XSS audit
  run: python3 scripts/xss_audit.py . --format github --ci

# GitLab CI
xss-audit:
  script:
    - python3 scripts/xss_audit.py . --ci
  allow_failure: false

# Pre-commit hook
#!/bin/sh
python3 ~/.claude/skills/phy-xss-audit/scripts/xss_audit.py . --ci

Example Output

======================================================================
  phy-xss-audit — XSS Vulnerability Report
======================================================================
  Total: 3  |  Critical: 1  |  High: 2
======================================================================

🔴 [XV005] CRITICAL — Django mark_safe() / autoescape off (CWE-79)
   File : app/views.py:47
   Code : return mark_safe(request.GET.get('content', ''))
   Fix  : Never call mark_safe() on user input. Use bleach.clean() first.

🟠 [XV001] HIGH — innerHTML / outerHTML with user data (CWE-79)
   File : src/components/Comment.tsx:23
   Code : el.innerHTML = comment.body
   Fix  : Sanitize with DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput) before innerHTML.

🟠 [XV004] HIGH — dangerouslySetInnerHTML without DOMPurify (CWE-79)
   File : src/components/Post.jsx:61
   Code : dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: post.content }}
   Fix  : dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(post.content) }}

OWASP Coverage

This skill covers OWASP A03:2021 — Injection (XSS vector).

OWASP ID	Description	Checks
A03:2021	Injection — Cross-Site Scripting	XV001–XV010

phy- suite OWASP coverage after this skill:

A01 — phy-path-traversal-audit ✅
A02 — phy-crypto-audit ✅
A03 — phy-xss-audit ✅ ← this skill
A04 — phy-cors-audit ✅
A05 — phy-security-headers ✅
A06 — phy-dep-upgrade ✅
A07 — phy-session-audit ✅
A08 — phy-deserialization-audit ✅
A09 — phy-otel-audit ✅ (observability/logging)
A10 — phy-ssrf-audit ✅

Full OWASP Top 10 coverage achieved.

Companion Skills

Skill	Relationship
`phy-cors-audit`	CORS misconfig → OWASP A04
`phy-session-audit`	Cookie/session security → OWASP A07
`phy-ssrf-audit`	Server-side request forgery → OWASP A10
`phy-crypto-audit`	Weak cryptography → OWASP A02
`phy-security-headers`	Missing CSP headers that mitigate XSS

Technical Notes

Zero external dependencies — pure Python 3 stdlib (re, pathlib, argparse, json)
Skips: .git/, node_modules/, __pycache__/, dist/, build/, .venv/
Encodings: tries utf-8 first, falls back to latin-1
XV003 (eval) skips files named *.test.js / *.spec.ts to reduce test utility false positives
Proximity window: user input must be within ±10–20 lines of the dangerous sink (configurable per check)
False positive mitigation: sanitizer guards auto-suppress findings when detected near the sink

Author

Canlah AI — Run performance marketing without breaking your brand.

GitHub: github.com/PHY041
All Skills: clawhub.ai/PHY041