T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:48- Finding
Unverified Mutable Executable Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill matches its stated purpose, but it asks users to install an unverified remote agent binary and configure broad automatic and Discord-accessible agent permissions.
Review carefully before installing. Prefer a pinned, verified Corust release, avoid approve-all unless you fully trust the agent and environment, and replace the Discord wildcard with explicit trusted users, roles, channels, or guilds.
SKILL.md:48Unverified Mutable Executable Is Downloaded and Executed
SKILL.md:124Downloaded Agent Is Granted an Excessive Approve-All Permission Policy
SKILL.md:148Wildcard Discord Authorization Allows Untrusted Users to Spawn Agent Sessions
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
-o /tmp/corust-agent.tar.gz tar -xzf /tmp/corust-agent.tar.gz -C "$HOME/corust" chmod +x "$HOME/corust/corust-agent-acp" rm /tmp/corust-agent.tar.gz
Adjust the archive name based on detected platform:
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
# Example for macOS Apple Silicon
mkdir -p "$HOME/corust"
curl -fSL "https://github.com/Corust-ai/corust-agent-release/releases/latest/download/agent-darwin-arm64.tar.gz" \
-o /tmp/corust-agent.tar.gz
tar -xzf /tmp/corust-agent.tar.gz -C "$HOME/corust"
Configuring the ACPX plugin with permissionMode set to approve-all disables interactive approval and grants the agent broad automatic permission to perform actions. For a coding agent reachable via chat, this materially increases the chance that prompt injection, misuse, or operator mistakes lead to unintended file, command, or network actions.
The skill recommends permissionMode: "approve-all" but does not explain that this removes a key safety checkpoint for agent actions. Without a warning, operators may unknowingly deploy an auto-executing agent configuration that is unsafe for general use, especially when coupled with chat-based triggering.
The skill instructs setting channels.discord.allowFrom to ["*"], which broadly permits requests from any Discord source/DM context rather than limiting access to trusted users, roles, or channels. In the context of installing and exposing a coding agent, this unnecessarily widens the attack surface and can allow untrusted users to trigger agent sessions.
The skill tells users to enable unrestricted Discord access without warning that this may expose the agent to unsolicited DMs or untrusted users. Omitting that warning makes unsafe deployment more likely because users may copy the configuration verbatim without understanding the access-control consequences.
No suspicious patterns detected.