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Security audit

AURA

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward personality settings helper that changes the agent’s style through a local workspace file.

Install only if you want a workspace-level personality profile. Review AURA.yaml before relying on it, be cautious about adding the optional AGENTS.md startup rule in shared or untrusted repositories, and remember that /aura reset removes AURA.yaml but does not necessarily remove any startup rule you manually added.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:84
Finding
Persistent Agent Behavior Modification Through Workspace Instructions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 84–92 **Vulnerability Type**: Persistent agent memory poisoning **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## Loading AURA at Startup Add to your AGENTS.md: ```markdown ## Personality If AURA.yaml exists in workspace, read it at session start and apply the personality traits to all responses. ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill recommends modifying `AGENTS.md`, a persistent workspace instruction file, so that the agent reads `AURA.yaml` at every session startup and applies its contents to all responses. This establishes `AURA.yaml` as a persistent behavior-control channel. The documented loading process does not require strict schema validation, rejection of unknown keys, trusted-file ownership checks, or separation of configuration values from executable natural-language instructions. Consequently, a party with workspace write access could replace or alter `AURA.yaml` and attempt to introduce behavior-changing content that affects future, unrelated sessions. The persistence is intentional at the personality level, but storing the loader rule in `AGENTS.md` broadens the effect beyond the invocation that configured AURA and creates the memory-poisoning risk. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent follows the Skill and adds the supplied startup-loading rule to `AGENTS.md`. 2. An attacker, compromised tool, or untrusted project contributor obtains write access to the workspace. 3. The attacker creates or modifies `AURA.yaml`, adding manipulated values or instruction-like content outside the intended personality schema. 4. A subsequent agent session reads `AGENTS.md` during initialization. 5. The persistent rule causes the agent to load the attacker-controlled `AURA.yaml`. 6. If the file is treated as behavioral instructions rather than strictly validated data, the malicious content influences responses and decisions across subsequent sessions. This path requires the at ...[truncated 721 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Do not instruct the Skill to modify persistent agent-control files such as `AGENTS.md` by default. 2. Load the personality profile only when the user explicitly invokes the Skill, or scope it to the current session unless persistent behavior is separately confirmed. 3. Parse `AURA.yaml` as structured data using a strict schema: - Permit only documented fields. - Require the expected numeric and Boolean types. - Enforce numeric ranges from 1 through 10. - Reject unknown keys, nested instruction fields, tags, aliases, and free-form directives. 4. Treat all profile values as inert configuration data, never as natural-language instructions. 5. Before enabling persistence, display the exact file path, duration, affected sessions, and configuration values, and require explicit user approval. 6. Verify that the profile resides within the expected workspace root and is not a symbolic link to another location. 7. Warn when `AURA.yaml` changes after approval and require reauthorization before loading the modified profile. 8. Provide a reset operation that removes both `AURA.yaml` and any AURA-related startup rule previously inserted into `AGENTS.md`. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The markdown states that `/aura` creates or updates `AURA.yaml` and `/aura reset` removes it, but it does not include a clear user-facing warning that these commands will modify files in the workspace. Although this is part of the skill's function, the description omits an explicit caution about data/system effects as required for markdown-file warning checks.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.