Ecommerce Marketing Strategy Builder

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 14, 2026 · 10:03 PM UTC
• Version: 0.1.0

Overview

This skill is a marketing planning guide that asks for expected business inputs and competitor research, with supply-chain and privacy cautions but no hidden execution or data access behavior in the artifact.

Install only if you trust the publisher and installation source, and consider pinning or reviewing the resolved package/repository before using the global npx command. When using the skill, provide public product and competitor details where possible and avoid sharing confidential margins, customer records, contracts, or nonpublic strategy unless you are comfortable giving that context to the agent environment.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:17

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Packages and Repository Content Installed Globally

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:17 and SKILL.md:420
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies and mutable repository content
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

At SKILL.md:17:

bash

npx skills add nexscope-ai/eCommerce-Skills --skill ecommerce-marketing-strategy-builder -g

At SKILL.md:420:

bash

npx skills add nexscope-ai/eCommerce-Skills --skill ecommerce-ppc-strategy-planner -g

Technical Analysis

Both documented commands invoke npx without pinning the skills package to a reviewed version. They also reference Skill content through a mutable repository identifier rather than an immutable commit or verified release.

Consequently, the commands may retrieve and execute content that differs from the content reviewed in this audit. The -g option installs the selected Skill globally, increasing its availability and potential effect beyond the current project.

This is a supply-chain exposure rather than evidence that the current repository contains a malicious payload. Exploitation depends on compromise or malicious modification of the npm package, its distribution path, the referenced repository, or another upstream component used during installation.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the unpinned npm package, the referenced repository, or an associated upstream distribution account.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version or modifies the mutable Skill content.
3. A user follows one of the documented npx skills add commands.
4. npx obtains the currently available package rather than a specifically reviewed version.
5. The installer retrieves and installs the attacker-controlled Skill content globally.
6. Any malicious behavior supplied by the compromised upstream component may execute during installation or when the installed Skill is later invoked.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could execute upstream-controlled code with the privileges o ...[truncated 528 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin the skills npm package to an explicitly reviewed version instead of allowing npx to select mutable upstream content.
2. Pin the repository dependency to an immutable commit hash or a cryptographically verified release.
3. Publish and verify integrity hashes or signatures for distributed Skill artifacts.
4. Review the resolved package and Skill contents before installation, including lifecycle scripts and transitive dependencies.
5. Remove -g unless global installation is operationally necessary; prefer project-scoped or otherwise isolated installation.
6. Run installation with a minimally privileged account in a sandbox or disposable environment.
7. Use lockfiles, trusted registries, dependency allowlists, and automated supply-chain scanning where the tooling supports them.
8. Document the exact package version and repository revision that were reviewed so users can reproduce the audited installation.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (3)

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 78% confidence

Finding

The skill asks users to provide competitor names or URLs and encourages analysis of competitor reviews and social content, but it does not warn users not to include confidential internal strategy, nonpublic market intelligence, or sensitive business context in their prompt. This creates a modest privacy and business-sensitivity risk because users may overshare strategic information while following the skill's data collection workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.