T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:3- Finding
Global Instruction Hijacking and Safety-Response Suppression
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This ads-management skill is mostly coherent, but it gives the assistant broad automatic authority over sensitive business workflows with weak scoping and unsafe credential guidance.
Review this before installing if the connected tools can read ad accounts, approve proposals, publish content, or change Meta settings. It should be limited to explicit ads commands, require confirmation for writes and publishing, avoid storing free-form instructions, and move access-token setup to a secure settings flow.
SKILL.md:3Global Instruction Hijacking and Safety-Response Suppression
SKILL.md:49Unvalidated Persistent Storage of Sender-Controlled Instructions
The manifest description says the skill 'MUST trigger for every message from boss,' creating an extremely broad activation scope. That increases the chance the skill will intercept unrelated messages and autonomously invoke tools or actions in contexts where the user did not explicitly request them, especially given the zero-question policy elsewhere in the file.
The explicit directive to act 'WITHOUT asking' is a form of autonomous decision-making that bypasses normal confirmation and clarification safeguards. In this skill, that autonomy is more dangerous because it is paired with mandatory triggering and direct tool invocation, increasing the likelihood of unnecessary data access or unintended operational behavior.
On first message of the day → automatically call WITHOUT asking:
ads_manager_brief(mode: "report")
The skill instructs the assistant to automatically call reporting and alert tools on the first morning message 'WITHOUT asking,' which causes proactive data access and processing without an explicit request at that moment. In a boss-facing skill tied to ads data, this can expose sensitive business metrics or normalize silent tool execution without transparency.
The communication policy requires 'Language: Vietnamese (unless boss writes English)' and mandates addressing the user as 'Sếp' while forbidding other forms of address. This is a locale/language policy constraint imposed by default rather than offered as a user choice or clearly justified as a region-specific requirement.
The guidance explicitly includes meta.accessToken: <token> and related secret-bearing configuration fields in chat-facing instructions. Even though shown as an example, this pattern encourages requesting, pasting, or exposing live credentials in conversation, which can lead to secret leakage through chat logs, transcripts, or accidental sharing.
No suspicious patterns detected.