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Security audit

adserFB1

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly an ads assistant, but it gives the agent broad, underspecified authority to search, scrape, and call arbitrary external APIs.

Review this before installing if the agent will handle sensitive campaign, account, or customer data. The main concern is not hidden code, but broad instructions that may send data to search, scraping, Apify, Meta, or arbitrary REST endpoints without tight scoping. Prefer installing only if you trust the connected tools and can enforce API allowlists, token scoping, and explicit approval for POST requests or external scraping.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:20
Finding

Forced Tool Use Enables Unrestricted Outbound Network Requests

Content
View full analysis
, method: GET|POST, headers: {...}, body: {...}) → Can call ANY REST API → For custom Meta Graph API calls, other services ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill uses mandatory instructions to override truthful capability reporting and compel the agent to initiate tool calls. The directives `ALWAYS USE THESE`, `NEVER say "I cannot access external data"`, and `Always call a tool first` can alter the agent's normal decision-making and safety boundaries when the Skill is loaded. The documented `http_request` capability permits requests to any REST API without specifying: - An allowlist of approved domains - HTTPS-only transport - Restrictions on private, loopback, or link-local addresses - Redirect validation - Controls against forwarding credentials to untrusted hosts - User confirmation for state-changing requests - Request-body or header data minimization This unrestricted interface exceeds the minimum privileges necessary for campaign reporting and competitor research, which could be limited to identified Meta, Serper, and Apify endpoints. Although the file references `SERPER_API_KEY`, `META_ACCESS_TOKEN`, and `APIFY_TOKEN`, it does not explicitly instruct the agent to read, expose, or transmit those credentials to unrelated destinations. Credential exfiltration is therefore a risk enabled by the broad design, not a confirmed action in the reviewed file. ### Attack Path 1. The Skill is loaded for an advertising or competitor-research task. 2. Its mandatory language instr ...[truncated 1470 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The instruction that http_request can call ANY REST API creates a generic outbound capability with effectively no built-in boundary. In an agent setting, this can be abused to contact arbitrary hosts, exfiltrate sensitive data, invoke unsafe admin APIs, or bypass intended tool restrictions using attacker-supplied URLs and headers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documented purpose is a reporting/proposals assistant, but the skill expands its operational scope to include broad external search, scraping, and arbitrary REST access. That mismatch increases the chance of data exfiltration, unreviewed third-party access, and use of powerful network capabilities beyond what users would reasonably expect from the stated skill purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill mandates use of external search and scraping tools and even says to 'NEVER say' there is no external access, but it does not require disclosure to the user that data may be sent to third-party services or collected via scraping. This creates consent, privacy, and compliance risks, especially when handling competitor research or potentially sensitive campaign context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The Telegram surface is defined entirely through Vietnamese slash commands, which imposes a locale-specific interaction pattern. The file does not offer an alternative language, opt-in, or justification that this is intentionally restricted to a Vietnamese-speaking deployment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.