T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:14- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a legitimate Rivian telemetry purpose, but it asks users to install and authenticate a third-party CLI that handles sensitive vehicle location and account credentials with weak scoping and safety guidance.
Install only if you trust the rivian-ls upstream project and are comfortable giving it ongoing access to sensitive vehicle telemetry, including location. Prefer a pinned, verified release; avoid putting passwords or OTPs directly in shell commands or long-lived environment variables; protect or remove the credential cache when not needed; and do not expose dashboard or cron outputs unless access is restricted.
SKILL.md:14Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
SKILL.md:28Rivian Password and MFA Code Exposed Through Process Arguments and Environment Variables
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
rivian-ls login --otp 123456
Credentials are cached automatically at `~/.config/rivian-ls/credentials.json` and auto-refresh. Subsequent runs use the cache — no re-auth needed unless tokens expire.
## Usage
Documenting that credentials are cached at a fixed path highlights a sensitive secret store that could be targeted by other tools, users, or malicious prompts in an agentic environment. Because the cache enables ongoing authenticated access to vehicle status and location-related telemetry, compromise of this file could lead to persistent privacy loss and unauthorized account access.
rivian-ls login --otp 123456
Credentials cache to `~/.config/rivian-ls/credentials.json` and auto-refresh. After initial auth, subsequent runs use the cache automatically.
**Non-interactive (single command, if OTP is known in advance):**
```bash
The README explicitly advertises access to GPS location and dashboard exposure of Rivian telemetry, but it does not provide any meaningful privacy warning, consent guidance, retention limits, or recommendations to avoid exposing precise location data to other users or services. Because vehicle location is highly sensitive and can reveal home/work patterns and real-time whereabouts, normalizing its collection and sharing in automations increases privacy and stalking risk if the skill is used carelessly or the downstream dashboard/API is exposed.
The skill invokes shell commands extensively but does not declare any tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. In an agent environment, that omission can let the model execute shell actions more broadly than intended, increasing the chance of unsafe command execution, credential exposure, or privacy-impacting telemetry access.
The authentication section shows plaintext email/password/OTP usage on the command line and mentions persistent local credential caching, but it does not warn that command-line arguments may be exposed via shell history or process listings. In this skill's context, the data grants access to sensitive vehicle telemetry and potentially location information, so unsafe credential-handling guidance meaningfully raises privacy and account-compromise risk.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
if not live:
cmd.append("--offline")
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
No suspicious patterns detected.