T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- scripts/run_route_audit.sh:23
- Finding
- Predictable Temporary Files Permit Local File Overwrite and Audit Data Disclosure## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/run_route_audit.sh`, lines 23–25 **Vulnerability Type**: Predictable and insecure temporary-file handling **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash python3 "$DELIVERY_AUDIT" > /tmp/cron_delivery_audit.json "$ROUTE_CHECK_BIN" --all-crons --jobs "$JOBS_JSON" --json > /tmp/openclaw_route_check.json python3 -c 'import json; from pathlib import Path; print(json.dumps({"deliveryAudit": json.loads(Path("/tmp/cron_delivery_audit.json").read_text()), "routeAudit": json.loads(Path("/tmp/openclaw_route_check.json").read_text())}, indent=2))' ``` ### Technical Analysis The script stores audit results under fixed, predictable names in the globally writable `/tmp` directory. It neither creates these files atomically nor verifies that they are regular files owned by the invoking user. Shell output redirection follows symbolic links and truncates the destination before executing the associated command. A local attacker can therefore pre-create either output path as a symbolic link to another file. When a more privileged user runs the script, redirection may truncate or replace the linked file using that user's permissions. Alternatively, an attacker can pre-create an attacker-owned regular file at one of these paths. Because writing to an existing file does not necessarily change its ownership or restrictive properties, generated audit output may remain readable by the attacker. The risk is elevated by the script's use of resources under `/root/.openclaw`, which makes privileged execution plausible even though the documentation advises avoiding unnecessary elevated execution. ### Attack Path 1. A local attacker determines that the audit script uses `/tmp/cron_delivery_audit.json` and `/tmp/openclaw_route_check.json`. 2. Before the audit runs, the attacker either: - creates one of those paths as a symbolic link to a file writable by the eventual invoking user; or - creates an attacker-owned file at that ...[truncated 1220 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions Create a unique private temporary directory, restrict newly created files to the current user, and ensure cleanup on every exit path: ```bash umask 077 TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/openclaw-route-audit.XXXXXX")" trap 'rm -rf -- "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT DELIVERY_OUTPUT="$TMP_DIR/cron_delivery_audit.json" ROUTE_OUTPUT="$TMP_DIR/openclaw_route_check.json" python3 "$DELIVERY_AUDIT" > "$DELIVERY_OUTPUT" "$ROUTE_CHECK_BIN" --all-crons --jobs "$JOBS_JSON" --json > "$ROUTE_OUTPUT" python3 - "$DELIVERY_OUTPUT" "$ROUTE_OUTPUT" <<'PY' import json import sys from pathlib import Path delivery_path, route_path = map(Path, sys.argv[1:]) print(json.dumps({ "deliveryAudit": json.loads(delivery_path.read_text()), "routeAudit": json.loads(route_path.read_text()), }, indent=2)) PY ``` Additional hardening measures: - Continue advising users not to run the script with elevated privileges unless strictly necessary. - Avoid fixed filenames in any shared writable directory. - Keep `umask 077` so audit results are not readable by other users. - Use an `EXIT` trap to remove potentially sensitive output even if an audit command fails. - If persistent output is required, write it to a user-controlled directory with restrictive permissions rather than `/tmp`.