T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Unpinned npm Package Is Downloaded and Executed Through npx
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:10; additional configuration examples appear atREADME.md:16-17andREADME.md:30-31
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown **MCP package:** `@tongateway/mcp` (install via `npx -y @tongateway/mcp`)The README configuration similarly invokes the package without a version or integrity constraint:
json "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@tongateway/mcp"],Technical Analysis
The documented command uses
npx -yto retrieve and execute@tongateway/mcpwithout pinning an exact package version or verifying an integrity digest. Consequently, the code executed on a user's system can differ from the code that was reviewed when this Skill was published.The
-yoption automatically accepts installation prompts, reducing the opportunity for users to inspect the selected package version before execution. Although the documentation links to public source repositories, the audited project contains no executable MCP source and no mechanism proving that the npm artifact corresponds to a reviewed commit.This creates a supply-chain trust boundary around the current npm package publication. A compromised publisher account, malicious future release, or compromised build pipeline could cause arbitrary package lifecycle or runtime code to execute under the MCP client's operating-system account.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, release workflow, or package distribution process for
@tongateway/mcp. - The attacker publishes a malicious package version under the existing package name.
- A user installs or starts the documented MCP configuration.
npx -y @tongateway/mcpresolves and downloads the attacker-controlled current version without an exact version constraint.- npm executes the package under the user's local account.
- The mal ...[truncated 832 chars]
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, release workflow, or package distribution process for
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to a reviewed exact version, such as
@tongateway/mcp@x.y.z, rather than resolving the current release. - Maintain a lockfile and verify the npm package integrity digest before execution.
- Publish reproducible-build information that maps the npm artifact to a specific reviewed source commit.
- Download and inspect the package tarball before deployment in sensitive environments.
- Disable automatic acceptance where practical so package changes remain visible to administrators.
- Run the MCP server in a sandbox, container, or dedicated low-privilege account with narrowly scoped filesystem and network access.
- Restrict the process from unrelated credentials, SSH keys, browser profiles, and wallet files.
- Establish dependency monitoring and require review before updating the pinned package version.
- Pin the dependency to a reviewed exact version, such as
