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Security audit

ATP

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed paid ATP helper that signs testnet x402 calls, but users should treat the wallet key and dependency install carefully.

Install only if you intentionally want paid ATP calls. Use a new wallet with minimal testnet funds, keep ATP_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY out of broad shell environments when possible, review or pin the x402 dependency stack, and require approval before agents run the helper for paid requests.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Payment Dependencies Execute with Wallet Credentials

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 16; README.md, line 20; pay_and_run.py, lines 51–54
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies in a wallet-signing process
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md, line 16:

markdown
You need a wallet with USDC on it, set as `ATP_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY`, and the `x402` Python package installed (`pip install "x402[evm,httpx]"`).

README.md, line 20:

markdown
2. `pip install "x402[evm,httpx]"` -- `pay_and_run.py` needs it.

pay_and_run.py, lines 51–54:

python
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402Client
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact import ExactEvmScheme
from x402.http.clients import x402HttpxClient

Technical Analysis

The installation instructions resolve the latest dependency versions permitted by the package index because neither exact versions nor package hashes are specified. The imported x402, eth-account, and transitive dependency code executes in the same Python process that reads ATP_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY and constructs the wallet signer.

If a package release, publisher account, package-index response, or transitive dependency is compromised, malicious initialization code could access the process environment, steal the private key, modify the configured payment scheme, alter payment authorization behavior, or execute arbitrary code with the invoking user's operating-system privileges.

No credential-theft or malicious payment logic was found in the audited repository itself. The vulnerability is a supply-chain exposure arising from unverified dependency resolution in a security-sensitive process.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises an upstream package, its publisher account, or one of its transitive dependencies.

  2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that remains compatible with the unpinned installation command.

  3. A user follows the documented command:

    bash
    pip install "x402[evm,httpx
    

...[truncated 1118 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin exact versions of all direct dependencies, including x402, eth-account, and httpx.

  2. Generate and publish a fully resolved lock file covering transitive dependencies.

  3. Require cryptographic package hashes, for example through a requirements file installed with:

    bash
    python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
    
  4. Review and verify package publishers, release provenance, and dependency changes before updating the lock file.

  5. Run the helper in a dedicated virtual environment or restricted container with no unnecessary filesystem or environment access.

  6. Expose only ATP_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY to the isolated process rather than inheriting the user's complete environment.

  7. Continue requiring a dedicated, minimally funded wallet and avoid reusing a wallet that controls valuable assets.

  8. Document the expected payment network and recipient, and add validation where supported by the x402 client before authorizing payment.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill requests and instructs use of sensitive environment data (ATP_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY), shell execution, and outbound network access, but does not declare a restrictive tool scope. That creates a real risk that an agent may invoke high-risk capabilities without explicit policy boundaries, especially because the skill is designed to make paid external calls and handle a private key.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The trigger condition is broad: 'about to reason through a task with a STABLE, REPEATABLE shape' could match many normal user requests and encourages the agent to execute an external paid workflow instead of handling the task locally. Because the skill also involves network calls and a payment-capable secret, vague activation boundaries increase the chance of unintended invocation, unnecessary spending, and secret exposure paths.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.