T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:5
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:5`, `SKILL.md:51`, and `reference.md:6` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned and integrity-unverified package dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippets `SKILL.md:5`: ```yaml metadata: { "openclaw": { "emoji": "📧", "requires": { "bins": ["mailwise", "claude"], "env": { "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": { "description": "Anthropic API key (only needed for the 'analyze' command; alternative: authenticate via 'claude' CLI login)", "required": false } } }, "install": [{ "id": "pip", "kind": "uv", "package": "mailwise", "bins": ["mailwise"], "label": "Install MailWise from PyPI" }] } } ``` `SKILL.md:51`: ```bash pip install mailwise # 1. Install from PyPI ``` `reference.md:6`: ```bash pip install mailwise ``` ### Technical Analysis The project instructs the Agent or user to install `mailwise` from PyPI without specifying an audited version, cryptographic hash, or immutable source revision. The installation metadata similarly names only the mutable package identifier. Consequently, the code installed during separate deployments is not guaranteed to be the code that was reviewed. A compromised maintainer account, malicious future release, or compromise of the package distribution channel could cause installation or execution of attacker-controlled code. Depending on the package format and installer configuration, malicious behavior could occur through package build hooks during installation or when the installed `mailwise` executable is invoked. The reviewed project contains only Markdown documentation and does not include the dependency source, so the actual behavior of the installed executable cannot be independently verified from this artifact. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `mailwise` package publishing account, its release pipeline, or another part of the package distribution channel. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious vers ...[truncated 1417 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the dependency to a specifically reviewed version, for example: ```bash pip install mailwise==X.Y.Z ``` 2. Require cryptographic hashes through a locked requirements file: ```text mailwise==X.Y.Z --hash=sha256:EXPECTED_HASH ``` Install it with hash verification enabled: ```bash pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Update the Skill installation metadata so it resolves the same exact reviewed version rather than the latest release. 4. Record the upstream repository and immutable source commit corresponding to the approved package. 5. Audit the package source, build configuration, transitive dependencies, and published artifact before approving a version. 6. Use a trusted internal package mirror or allowlist when deploying in environments containing sensitive email archives. 7. Run installation and MailWise commands under a minimally privileged account, with access restricted to only the required email and index directories. 8. Avoid exposing unrelated secrets to the process environment; provide the Anthropic credential only when the external analysis feature is explicitly required.