Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md ### 调用流程(scripts/paid-call.mjs)
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed paid content-writing skill whose network and payment flow matches its stated purpose, with a notable supply-chain caution around the unpinned Alipay CLI install.
Install only if you are comfortable using this as a paid external service. Review the ¥0.15 price, endpoint, and Alipay tooling before paying, avoid sending confidential product or campaign details, and prefer a pinned or otherwise vetted version of the Alipay dependency in managed environments.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
### 调用流程(scripts/paid-call.mjs)
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
### 调用流程(scripts/paid-call.mjs)
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
### 调用流程(scripts/paid-call.mjs)
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
### 调用流程(scripts/paid-call.mjs)
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
### 调用流程(scripts/paid-call.mjs)
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
The manifest description says trigger phrases include '种草文案' and '好物文案', which are relatively broad phrases that can overlap with ordinary requests for copywriting rather than clearly signaling this specific skill. The file does not provide exclusion conditions or negative examples to clarify when these phrases should not activate the skill.
The skill instructs installation via npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest, which pulls the newest package version at runtime without pinning. If the package is compromised upstream or a breaking/malicious release is published, users or agents following the skill could execute unreviewed code.
This skill is presented as a note-writing tool, but the script adds remote API invocation and payment-orchestration behavior not evident from the high-level description. That mismatch is security-relevant because hidden monetization and network/payment flows increase user exposure, reduce transparency, and make it easier to socially engineer users into authorizing actions they did not expect from a writing skill.
The script instructs users to install and trust a remote package via npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest, which fetches whatever code is current at execution time. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the package is compromised or a bad update is published, users could execute attacker-controlled code in the context of payment orchestration.
The pay and complete flows operationalize a payment-processing workflow inside a skill whose stated purpose is content generation. Even if legitimate, this capability broadens the trust boundary by introducing transaction handling, external tooling, and resource retrieval; in this context, that makes accidental misuse or deceptive charging more dangerous than it would be in a clearly declared commerce skill.
The error message again directs operators to run npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install, reinforcing execution of an unpinned remote package. Recommending this in runtime guidance increases the chance that users will immediately run mutable third-party code without review, expanding the skill's supply-chain attack surface.
No suspicious patterns detected.