T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:65- Finding
Hard-Coded External Spreadsheet Destination for Customer PII
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 65-70
Vulnerability Type: Hard-coded external data destination and insufficient authorization validation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet
text ## 腾讯文档线索表对接(已建,勿重复创建) - 文档地址:https://docs.qq.com/sheet/DTHhPaFBHSEV2VGNS - file_id:`LxOhPGHEvTcR`,子表 sheet_id:`BB08J2` - 13 列字段:线索ID / 留资时间 / 来源渠道 / 关联园区 / 客户昵称 / 客户留言 / 联系电话 / 意向等级 / 意向标签 / 跟进状态 / 跟进人 / 最近跟进时间 / 备注 - 追加新线索:定位第 0 列最后一个非空行 +1 作为新行,用 `set_range_value` 写入该行 13 个字段;表头为第 0 行,禁止覆盖 - 线索ID 规则:`L-YYYY-NNNN`(如 L-2026-0001)Technical Analysis
The Skill embeds a fixed Tencent Docs URL, file identifier, and sheet identifier, then instructs the agent to append lead records containing customer nicknames, messages, and telephone numbers. These identifiers are configuration data tied to a specific external storage destination, but they are distributed directly in the reusable Skill definition.
The Skill describes the spreadsheet as authorized, but it does not define a runtime control that verifies the document owner, tenant, access policy, requesting organization, or intended destination before transmitting PII. It also does not require confirmation that the affected customer consented to this storage or that an applicable lawful basis and retention policy exist.
Consequently, installing or reusing the Skill in another environment may cause that environment's lead information to be written to the same globally fixed spreadsheet. The document identifiers do not necessarily grant access by themselves, but they direct any agent already possessing compatible Tencent Docs credentials toward a predetermined external data sink.
Attack Path
- The Skill is installed or invoked in an environment with access to the Tencent Docs integration.
- A user provides comments, private messages, or lead details for intent classification.
- The agent extracts fields such as the customer's nickna ...[truncated 1313 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the Tencent Docs URL, file identifier, and sheet identifier from the reusable Skill definition.
- Supply the destination through deployment-specific protected configuration rather than agent-visible instructions.
- Require an administrator to configure and explicitly approve the destination before enabling lead writes.
- Validate the authenticated Tencent account, document ownership, tenant, sheet schema, and write permissions before transmitting data.
- Display the destination organization and document name for human confirmation before the first PII write and whenever configuration changes.
- Enforce least-privilege credentials restricted to the approved document and append-only operations where supported.
- Establish consent or lawful-basis checks, data-retention limits, deletion procedures, access logging, and periodic permission reviews.
- Minimize collected data. Avoid storing full customer messages or telephone numbers unless they are necessary and authorized, and redact unrelated sensitive content.
- Add tenant separation controls so different deployments cannot write to the same sheet unless deliberate shared storage is explicitly approved.
- Fail closed when destination ownership or authorization cannot be verified; do not fall back to the hard-coded document.
