Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This skill is a coherent RunComfy image-outpainting helper, with a real but disclosed supply-chain caution around unpinned CLI installation.
Before installing, prefer a reviewed pinned version of `@runcomfy/cli`, avoid running npm as an administrator, and provide `RUNCOMFY_TOKEN` only when you intend to use RunComfy. Expect prompts and image URLs used for outpainting to be sent to RunComfy's service.
Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)
T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation and Execution
Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location: SKILL.md, lines 42 and 185 Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency execution Risk Level: Medium
Vulnerable code at line 42:
bash
npm i -g @runcomfy/cli # or: npx -y @runcomfy/cli --version
Vulnerable code at line 185:
markdown
- **Install via verified package manager only.** Use `npm i -g @runcomfy/cli` or `npx -y @runcomfy/cli`. **Agents must not pipe an arbitrary remote install script into a shell on the user's behalf**.
Technical Analysis
The documented commands resolve @runcomfy/cli from the npm registry without pinning an exact reviewed version or verifying package integrity. The repository provides no lockfile, checksum, vendored implementation, or provenance policy that would make the downloaded code reproducible and independently auditable.
An npm installation may run package lifecycle scripts. The npx -y alternative automatically downloads and executes the currently resolved package without interactive confirmation. Consequently, the code executed by users or agents can change after this skill has been reviewed.
This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current RunComfy package is malicious. The scoped package name is consistent with the declared service provider, but package-account compromise, a malicious future release, or compromise of a transitive dependency could turn the recommended installation step into arbitrary local code execution.
Attack Path
An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release process, registry delivery path, or a dependency included by a future @runcomfy/cli release.
The attacker publishes a malicious version under the same package name or introduces malicious install-time/runtime code through a dependency.
A user or agent follows the instructions in SKILL.md and executes npm i -g @runcomfy/cli or npx -y @runcomfy/cli.
4
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Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
Pin the CLI to an exact reviewed version, such as:
bash
npm install -g @runcomfy/cli@X.Y.Z
Replace npx -y @runcomfy/cli with an exact-version invocation and avoid automatic execution of unreviewed releases:
bash
npx --no-install @runcomfy/cli --version
This should be used only after installing and reviewing the pinned package.
Publish and verify the expected npm integrity digest, package provenance, and publisher identity through trusted documentation.
Use a lockfile or equivalent dependency manifest in any wrapper project so transitive dependency versions are reproducible.
Review package contents, lifecycle scripts, and dependency changes before updating the pinned version.
Install and execute the CLI as an unprivileged user in a sandbox or isolated environment with minimal filesystem and network access.
Avoid exposing unrelated secrets to the installation or execution process. Provide RUNCOMFY_TOKEN only when the authenticated operation is required.
Document a controlled update process that includes security review and integrity verification before changing the approved version.
The manifest lists several specific trigger phrases, but then broadens activation to "any explicit ask to add canvas around an existing still." That catch-all condition is ambiguous and lacks clear boundaries or negative examples, increasing the risk of unintended invocation from common image-editing requests.
Content
No source excerpt is available for this finding.
Rp1
Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill recommends executing npx -y @runcomfy/cli without pinning a specific version, which allows whatever package version is current at execution time to run. If the package is compromised upstream or a breaking/malicious release is published, users or agents could execute attacker-controlled code during install/startup.
Content
No source excerpt is available for this finding.
Rp1
Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The security section explicitly endorses npx -y @runcomfy/cli as a safe installation method, but it still fetches and executes the latest published package version without version pinning. That creates a software supply-chain risk inconsistent with the surrounding security guidance, because a compromised or unexpected release could be executed automatically.