T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:40- Finding
Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party CLI
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 40
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installed globally
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet:
bash npm i -g @runcomfy/cliTechnical Analysis
The documented prerequisite installs the latest available version of
@runcomfy/cliglobally without an exact version pin, lockfile, or integrity verification. Consequently, the package contents executed by users can change after the Skill has been reviewed.npm installation may execute package lifecycle scripts with the privileges of the invoking user. If the package, publisher account, or distribution channel is compromised, following this instruction could execute attacker-controlled code locally. The global installation scope also makes the installed executable available outside this Skill and increases the potential impact of a compromised or incompatible release.
The CLI's network communication with RunComfy is necessary for the declared hosted image-editing functionality and is explicitly disclosed. The identified issue is therefore not covert exfiltration, but the unsafe acquisition and global installation of an uncontrolled dependency version.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
@runcomfy/clinpm package, its publisher account, or a newly published package version. - The attacker adds malicious installation lifecycle code or modifies the CLI's runtime behavior.
- A user follows the prerequisite in
SKILL.mdand runsnpm i -g @runcomfy/cli. - npm retrieves the current uncontrolled release and may execute its lifecycle scripts with the user's privileges.
- The malicious package can access resources available to that user, including user-readable files, environment variables, RunComfy credentials, and files supplied to subsequent CLI operations.
- Because the package is installed globally, the compromised executable remains available for later invoc ...[truncated 745 chars]
- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
@runcomfy/clito an exact, reviewed version rather than installing the latest release, for example:bash npm install --global @runcomfy/cli@<reviewed-exact-version> - Publish and verify the expected package version, npm registry, publisher identity, and integrity hash in the installation documentation.
- Prefer a project-local dependency governed by a committed lockfile instead of a global installation where operationally feasible.
- Use deterministic installation mechanisms such as
npm ciwith a reviewed lockfile. - Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation when the package supports operation without them, and separately perform any strictly necessary trusted setup.
- Run installation and subsequent CLI operations as an unprivileged user with access limited to the files and environment variables required for the image-editing task.
- Review dependency updates before changing the pinned version and monitor the package and publisher for supply-chain compromise.
- Pin
